This goes to show how many players there are in the opposition--there
   isn't just one main opposition leader. Several groups and several players
   within those groups too, all highlighted in the attachment. Ashley is
   going a good job of keeping up with all of this.

   -------- Original Message --------

   Subject: Re: Syrian Opposition                          
      Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2011 09:57:52 -0600 (CST)          
      From: Ashley Harrison <ashley.harrison@stratfor.com> 
        To: Korena Zucha <zucha@stratfor.com>              

   Attached is one of my docs on the opposition, it is actually the shortened
   version and is still 14 pages.  I haven't updated it in 1-2 months, but
   much of it still stands.

     ----------------------------------------------------------------------

   From: "Korena Zucha" <zucha@stratfor.com>
   To: "Ashley Harrison" <ashley.harrison@stratfor.com>
   Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2011 2:47:46 PM
   Subject: Syrian Opposition

   Hey Ashley,

   We've provided an overview of the Syrian opposition in the analysis below
   but do you have any more info on specific leaders within these opposition
   players and main figures beyond Ali Bayanouni? No need to do any special
   research for this at this point. I know you've looked into this so was
   just wondering if you had a list of key players? Whatever is most simple
   works. For example "name--organization/sect/group whatever."

   If not, that's fine, just let me know. Thanks.

   -------- Original Message --------

   Subject: Re: syrian opposition                                             
      Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2011 14:30:24 -0600                                   
      From: Korena Zucha <zucha@stratfor.com>                                 
        To: Fred Burton <burton@stratfor.com>                                 
        CC: 'korena zucha' <korena.zucha@stratfor.com>, Anya Alfano           
            <Anya.Alfano@stratfor.com>                                        

   We provided an overview in an analysis below. Multiple actors that make up
   the opposition.

   http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110928-syrian-opposition-perception-and-reality

  Makeup of the Opposition

   There are factions of the opposition that operate both inside Syria and
   outside. The external opposition is highly fractured, composed of people
   who cannot account authoritatively for the reality on the ground.

   The protests on the ground consist primarily of young and middle-aged men,
   though women and children are also present at times. The largest protests
   materialize after Friday prayers, when participants congregate on the
   streets outside mosques. That is not to say protests are relegated solely
   to Fridays; a number of demonstrations have been held on other days of the
   week but on a smaller scale. These protests also consist of men, women and
   children of all ages.

   But the opposition is ideologically diverse. A key element of what is
   considered Syria's traditional opposition - groups that have long been
   opposed to the regime - is the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which the
   regime has demonized throughout the unrest. In 1976, the Syrian MB began
   an armed insurgency against the Alawite regime, led at the time by al
   Assad's father, Hafez. By 1982 the group was crushed in the notorious Hama
   massacre that allegedly killed some 30,000 civilians. The MB was driven
   underground, and dissenters in other Sunni majority cities, including Jisr
   al-Shughour, were quickly stamped out.

   Today, the Syrian MB remains a key participant in the opposition movement,
   but its capabilities inside Syria are weak. Syrian MB leader Ali Bayanouni
   resides in exile in London, and the Syrian MB outside Syria has become
   increasingly involved in the external opposition movement, participating
   in conferences such as the NCS conference in Istanbul in late August.

   However, the Syrian MB is unable to maintain much influence in Syria due
   to a limited presence inside the country, and it would take a concerted
   effort on the part of the Islamist group to earn the trust and fellowship
   of other Syrians. Since the banning of the Syrian MB in 1980, al Assad's
   regime has been quick to blame the organization for militant attacks as a
   means of instilling fear of the MB among Syrian citizens. Christians,
   Alawites, and even other Muslims are wary of a conservative Sunni group
   gaining political influence in the regime.

   Opposition has also traditionally been found in Syria's mostly Kurdish
   northeast due to the Kurds' long-standing grievances against the regime,
   which has denied the group basic rights and citizenship. The Kurds have
   taken part in conferences led by the external opposition, such as the NCS
   meeting in Istanbul. Protests have meanwhile occurred in Kurdish majority
   cities such as Darbasiyah, Amuda and Qamishli, but they have not reached
   the scale of unrest as those in Sunni-concentrated areas. The Kurds and
   Sunnis may share the desire for regime change, but once the goal of regime
   change is achieved, whoever is in power, aside from the Kurds, will seek
   to contain Kurdish separatism. There already have been indications that
   Kurdish representatives among Syria's protest movement are being excluded
   from the process of drafting demands.

   The Syrian MB and the Kurds are two of several groups that have tried to
   coalesce, without much success, into a more substantial opposition force
   inside Syria in recent years. These groups took advantage of the Syrian
   regime's weakened position following the withdrawal from Lebanon in the
   spring of 2005 by drafting and signing the Damascus Declaration in October
   of the same year. Written by Syrian dissident Michel Kilo, the declaration
   was a statement of unity calling for political reforms. Declaration
   signatories include the Kurdish Democratic Alliance in Syria and the
   Kurdish Democratic Front in Syria. The Syrian MB was originally part of
   the Damascus Declaration, but internal disagreements led the MB to
   distance itself from this opposition movement in 2009. Disunity among the
   opposition remains to this day.

   Despite the disconnect between the external and internal opposition
   forces, some progress is being made to bridge the gap. Of the various
   councils formed by opposition members outside Syria, the NCS has recently
   emerged as the only council that has received the support of the Local
   Coordinating Committees (LLC), a group that claims to unite roughly 120
   smaller coordinating committees across Syria. The NCS was selected by a
   diverse committee of independents, leftists, liberals and Kurds and claims
   that roughly half of its members, which include grassroots activists and
   traditional opposition supporters, are based inside Syria.

   In the past, the LLC and many other internal Syrian opposition groups,
   fearing competition, have been quick to denounce the formation of these
   external councils. Although many logistical constraints of uniting the
   external and internal opposition persist, the fact that the LLC has
   pledged support for the NCS and called upon the Damascus Declaration
   parties and Kurdish leadership to do so mean this should be watched as a
   potential sign of the opposition gaining coherence.