Gulen movement: Turkey's third power

   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+
   |  Key Points                                                            |
   |                                                                        |
   |  * Turkey's Islamist Gulen movement, while a powerful political force, |
   |    is largely an unfamiliar entity to the West.                        |
   |                                                                        |
   |  * The movement's extensive operations in various fields, including    |
   |    education and media, give it unique access and influence.           |
   |                                                                        |
   |  * While secular Turks and the military continue to have serious       |
   |    reservations about the movement, its relationship with other        |
   |    Islamists is also complicated.                                      |
   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+

   Despite its political influence in Turkey, the Gulen movement has a low
   profile in the West. Jane's charts the group's rise to prominence,
   examines its current activities and assesses its relationship with secular
   Turks, as well as the country's military and other Islamists.

   Turkey's Fethullah Gulen Community (FGC), also known as the Gulen movement
   after its founder and leader Fethullah Gulen, a Turkish Muslim preacher,
   often escapes scholarly attention. Yet no analysis of Turkey is complete
   without due attention paid to the FGC; a highly co-ordinated and
   centralised movement with many well-positioned followers, known as
   Gulenists. Some Turks deridingly refer to the movement as 'F-type' or
   'Fethullahci' (followers of Fethullah).

   According to FGC members, the organisation controls millions of dollars
   and has many organisations, including a network of high schools across the
   world that serve as signpost FGC institutions. In addition, the FGC owns
   universities, banks, non-governmental organisations and television
   networks in Turkey, as well as other countries. What is more, the FGC
   appears to have influence over the Turkish National Police (Emniyet),
   including the police's powerful domestic intelligence wing. The FGC's
   political power renders it a taboo topic in Turkey where many people shy
   away from discussing the group publicly. The Turks have a polarised view
   of Gulen: some see him as a political leader such as Iran's Ayatollah
   Khomeini, while others view him as the face of modern, non-violent, even
   reformed Islam. This and the FGC's political power makes the organisation
   worthy of closer scrutiny in an effort to map out its structure, global
   reach, message, political influence and future in Turkey.

  Background

   The FGC is considered a modernist off-shoot of Sufi Nurcu tariqat
   (religious order) in Turkey. The movement aims to transform Turkey through
   conservative social values. Many academics describe the FGC as a neo-Nurcu
   movement. Gulen, a spiritual and charismatic preacher who has been known
   to cry during interviews and public sermons, is the founder and leader of
   his own branch of Nurcu Islam. The movement emerged in the late 1970s in
   Izmir, coalescing around Gulen's personality in the late 1980s in big
   cities. Initially, Gulen espoused a tactical view of democracy in Turkey,
   saying that in order to reach the ideal Muslim society "every method and
   path is acceptable [including] lying to people". Gulen added that in
   reaching the movement's final goal, "service on behalf of the movement
   would be discreet and quiet", and that this stance constituted the
   "founding philosophy of his movement".

   In the late 1990s, Gulen clashed with Turkey's secular democracy. At this
   time, Turkey had a brief experience with Islamist government. The Welfare
   Party (Refah Partisi: RP) came to power in a short-lived coalition
   government in 1996. Subsequently, Turkey's secular forces, including the
   military, forced the RP to step down. Following the demise of the RP
   government, Turkey cracked down against Islamist movements and tariqats,
   including FGC, bringing a court case against Gulen on grounds that "he was
   working to overthrow secular government in Turkey".

   In 1998, Gulen was forced to leave Turkey to avoid prosecution on charges
   he was involved with anti-secular activities. He took refuge in the United
   States and starting running his organisation from the suburbs of New
   Jersey and then Pennsylvania through senior aides in various outlets he
   controlled.

   In the US, Gulen's message subsequently went through a significant
   transformation. He rejected some of his earlier rhetoric on dismantling
   the secular state, turning instead to emphasising tolerance in Islam, as
   well as interfaith dialogue with Judaism and Christianity, and shunned
   violence. In the late 1990s, he told his male followers their wives could
   uncover their hair. While part of the Islamic law, he said this issue of
   head covering was futurat (among the details of Islamic jurisprudence).
   This stance widened his appeal for the liberal Turks who thought of the
   Gulen movement as a more tolerable version of Islamic fundamentalism.
   Although the majority of Gulenist women continued to cover their heads,
   this verdict has sweetened his appeal for students in Gulen's network of
   schools across the world, as well as middle-class conservatives.

  Global network

   The precise number of FGC members is difficult to estimate since some
   publicly deny affinity or membership with the movement. They do not
   mention his name openly, but may refer to him as 'hocaefendi' (master
   hodja) or 'he'.

   Although the movement emerged from Turkey, today it has a global reach.
   Gulen continues to live in the US and obtained US residency in 2008. Since
   Gulen's arrival there, FGC is known to have supported the election
   campaigns of various US politicians. It has also sought their blessing by
   asking them to appear at FGC events. For instance, Hillary Clinton is
   known to have attended FGC events in the US, including a September 2007
   Ramadan breakfast organised by the Gulenist Turkish Cultural Center in New
   York City. The FGC's new found base in the US has earned Washington enmity
   inside Turkey, with some secular Turks, including many in the military,
   concluding that the movement is backed by the US as a form of moderate
   Islam to dilute Turkish secularism. Gulen and other FGC leaders'
   freewheeling presence in the US is a major source of anti-US feeling
   within the ranks of the Turkish military.

   The FGC exerts influence globally through means of modern communication,
   including its flagship newspaper and television networks, respectively
   Zaman (Time), and Samanyolu (Milky Way) - galactic, cosmic and temporal
   names are tell-tale signs of FGC institutions. The organisation has
   numerous other media arms, including Ebru TV (Water Marble) in the US, as
   well as Mehtap (Moonlight) TV and Cihan (Universe) news agency, and
   Today's Zaman, an English language newspaper that mirrors Zaman and serves
   as the FGC's window to the English-speaking world. Zaman also publishes
   local versions in a number of countries, including the US, Turkmenistan,
   Bulgaria and Azerbaijan.

   Many organisations fall under the FGC umbrella, including hundreds of
   boarding schools in Turkey, as well as the US, Europe, Central Asia, the
   Middle East and Africa. These schools provide full scholarships, excellent
   facilities and high-quality education, training the children of the elite
   in the third world and the children of FGC members in the West. In Turkey,
   the schools perform both functions. The movement also has universities,
   including Fatih University in Istanbul, and Virginia International
   University in the US, a 'Gulen-sourced' school according to an FGC
   website. The schools represent the movement's charity arm, an FGC
   trademark. Its schools and other public arms are funded by regular
   donations from FGC members.

   In Turkey, the FGC appeals to students across various educational
   institutions. First come high schools, including elite FGC Samanyolu High
   School in Ankara, which offer scholarships and stipends. At least some of
   these students are known to join the FGC. The movement also runs cramming
   schools, such as Turkey-wide FEM and ANAFEN, preparing mostly poorer high
   school students and FGC sympathiser students through the necessary
   cramming practice for college entrance exams. This is done often in
   dormitories and again with full scholarships. Graduates of the cramming
   schools usually go on to become lifelong sympathisers, members or workers
   of the movement. The FGC also runs boarding homes (Isikevi-light houses)
   for poorer college and high school students who are then provided with
   stipends and scholarships. The FGC schools, cramming schools and Isikevis
   fall under a centralised organisation. The FGC schools and educational
   endeavours are academically thriving environments and also provide a soft
   passageway into the movement. Teachers and FGC member students extoll the
   virtues of Islam in non-Muslim countries and virtues of the FGC movement
   in Muslim countries, pulling in more members.

   A number of wealthy Turks, and many mid- and small-sized business owners
   organised under the Turkish Industrialists Confederation (TUSKON), form
   the FGC's business arm. The movement also has financial institutions,
   including Bank Asya that provides interest-free Islamic banking; insurance
   company Isik Sigorta (Light Insurance); and investment arms, including
   Asya Finans (Asia Finance), a finance firm. FGC has think-tanks, including
   Washington-based Rumi Forum, and is known to be supporting programmes on
   Turkey at a number of prominent Washington think-tanks. Finally, the FGC
   has global charities, such as Kimse Yok mu (Is Anybody Out There), which
   provides disaster relief and religious giving across the world.

   It is possible to think of the FGC structure as three concentric circles
   comprising of sympathisers, members and workers. The outermost circle has
   sympathisers, including people who attend weekly discussion sessions held
   at FGC homes and others, such as the high school students, who receive FGS
   services and charity benefits. The middle circle has members, including
   businessmen whose donations support the outer circle's activities, as well
   as pay for the salaries of the inner circle. This inner circle includes
   workers, such as teachers, journalists, lobbyists and executives who work
   in FGC schools, think-tanks, lobby and business groups, and media arms,
   among others. The workers are mostly committed members of the movement.
   Some of them seem to have joined the FGC through the group's cramming
   schools, high schools and boarding homes in the 1970s and the 1980s when
   Gulen was a preacher in Turkish mosques. Known as the Altin Nesil (Golden
   Generation), this group can be considered Gulenist disciples.

   The three circles are enmeshed into one another. For example, FGC
   businesses advertise heavily on FGC media, while FGC-owned media runs
   human interest stories and profiles of FGC sympathisers, businesses and
   schools. FGC members and sympathisers take holidays in FGC-owned hotels
   and shop at FGC-owned stores and invest in FGC financial institutions.
   Graduates of FGC cramming schools funded by FGC businesses often serve as
   teachers in FGC schools overseas. Finally, FGC media, funded by FGC
   businesses, reacts sharply to any criticism directed at Fethullah Gulen.

  One voice, two messages

   The FGC rose to global prominence in the aftermath of the 11 September
   2001 attacks in the US. The movement takes pride in promoting tolerance
   towards and inter-faith dialogue with Christianity and Judaism, which are
   considered by Muslims as faiths of the book - religions recognised by
   Islam.

   The FGC relays its brand of tolerance and ecumenical dialogue through
   conferences at prestigious institutions, FGC and non-FGC alike, as well as
   coverage in FGC media and through meetings between Gulen and Jewish and
   Christian religious leaders. The FGC takes the Islam-wide characteristic
   of tolerance towards Christianity and Judaism, marketing it as an
   exclusive trademark of the movement.

   The FGC's three messages of ecumenism, interfaith dialogue and tolerance
   matured after Gulen left Turkey for the US to escape political
   persecution. Since then, the movement has explicitly stayed away from
   anti-Americanism, a telltale sign of Islamist movements globally. The
   movement's three messages, communicated through English language outlets
   such as Today's Zaman have been welcome in the West, including in the US
   and the UK. The FGC promotes inter-faith dialogue and ecumenism also in
   Turkey, sometimes to the ire of hardline Islamists.

   However, the movement's English language outlets serving the West, such as
   Today's Zaman, and Turkish language press outlets serving Turkey, such as
   Zaman, have different editorial lines on the FGC messages. While Today's
   Zaman stays loyal to this message, Zaman often strays away from it. For
   example, on 15 October 2008, Zaman ran a news story alleging that the
   current global economic downturn started when USD40 billion was
   transferred from Lehman Brothers to Israel. Although Zaman and Today's
   Zaman are twin papers, this important allegation did not find room in
   Today's Zaman. In this regard, examples hinting at two FGC voices, an
   external one for the West, and an internal one for Turkey, are plenty. On
   8 November 2008, Zaman ran a story about a Jewish family in Istanbul that
   has converted to Islam. The story suggested that the family had been
   painfully ostracised from the Turkish Jewish community, casting that
   community in an unsympathetic light. That story was also not featured in
   Today's Zaman read in the West.

   Likewise, the two papers diverged in their coverage of the 2008-09
   Israel-Gaza war. On 31 December 2008, Zaman ran a story with the headline:
   Children hauling garbage are being targeted with missiles, while this
   headline or its story was entirely missing from Today's Zaman on the same
   day, or subsequent days.

  FGC, AKP and the military

   Traditionally, the FGC has supported many political parties and stayed
   non-partisan. However, since 2001, following the establishment of the
   Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi: AKP), the
   movement has provided solid support to the AKP. While this has led many
   people to associate the movement with the AKP, that appears to be a false
   premise. Although the AKP and FGC both stand for socially conservative
   values and mix Islam and politics, they are competing political
   organisations. Moreover, there seems to be at least some ideological
   competition between the AKP and FGC. The AKP cadres view the FGC's
   singular emphasis of ecumenism and inter-faith dialogue as insincere,
   while FGC members view the AKP as a coarse movement.

   Still, the goal of holding political power in Turkey unites the FGC and
   the AKP in an alliance of convenience. For analytical purposes, it could
   be said that currently the AKP and the FGC are in a symbiotic
   co-existence. The AKP provides the FGC with an important asset, a ruling
   party that facilitates the appointment of FGC members to key bureaucratic
   positions, as well as the sheltering of FGC institutions. For example,
   during his term as Turkey's foreign minister, President Abdullah Gul
   issued a classified circular to Turkish diplomatic posts, encouraging them
   to attend events at FGC institutions and help such organisations.
   Meanwhile, the FGC provides the AKP with money, media support and voter
   mobilisation.

   Since the AKP came to power in 2002, FGC members and sympathisers are
   known to have been appointed to a number of important positions in Turkish
   government, including ministries, as well as key positions in the Turkish
   police, while many lower level and non-strategic positions in Emniyet
   remain in the hands of non-FGC people. In this regard, some in Turkey
   believe the FGC controls the technologically apt intelligence branch of
   the police, as well as the strategic personnel and overseas relations
   departments. The FGC's influence in the Emniyet and a significant part of
   Turkish domestic intelligence apparatus is a contentious issue,
   challenging the movement's claim to be a spiritual organisation. Critics
   and opponents of the FGC and the AKP, even some top brass in the Turkish
   military, fear that they are under surveillance by the FGC through the
   Turkish police. Giving credit to such claims, intelligence leaks involving
   the Turkish military often start in FGC-owned newspapers, such as Zaman.
   Meanwhile, some alarmist secular Turks assert without proof that the FGC
   is funded by the CIA to promote moderate Islam in Turkey as well as in
   Central Eurasia - it is interesting to note that in 2007, Russia started a
   crackdown on FGC infrastructure for its 'extremist' nature.

   The FGC has a tense relationship with the Turkish military. Despite its
   presence in the Emniyet and across the Turkish bureaucracy, the FGC lacks
   representation in the Turkish armed forces. This is because the Turkish
   military bi-annually reviews its staff, discharging personnel associated
   with Islamist groups and tariqats, most notably the FGC. The military's
   hardnosed attitude to FGC members has turned the FGC into its critic.
   Since 2007, FGC-owned media has been lambasting the Turkish military. This
   media has been prominently featuring allegations against the military, as
   well as leaks from Emniyet about the likely involvement of retired and
   active duty military personnel in a coup plot against the AKP government
   in the Ergenekon case, an investigation of the clandestine nationalist
   Ergenekon organisation that is currently being reviewed in a Turkish
   court. In July 2008, using intelligence files leaked from Emniyet, Zaman
   and other FGC-owned media gave prominent coverage to Ergenekon-related
   news, implicating the military's hand in the alleged coup plot.

  Turkey's third force

   Lately, while pro-AKP newspapers have shunned criticising the military,
   the FGC-owned media continues to take issue with it. This suggests
   diverging views of the Turkish military between the AKP and FGC. Whereas
   common wisdom suggests thinking of Turkey as a bipolar world of the
   'Islamist block' led by the AKP and the 'secularist block' led by the
   military, it might be useful to think of Turkey as a three-pronged country
   composed of the military, the AKP and the FGC.

   The consolidation of political and economic power in the FGC's hands and
   the movement's evolving relationship with the AKP and the Turkish military
   make such an analytical view more plausible. With its own growing base,
   the FGC might soon feel comfortable to rethink its seven-year symbiotic
   relationship with the AKP. The FGC seems to want a bigger share of Turkey.
   The movement will keep confronting the military more vigorously until it
   manages to get its members and sympathisers into the military.

   On the other hand, there are at least some signs that on the eve of
   Turkey's nationwide local elections to be held in March 2009, the FGC
   might extend limited support to parties other than the AKP in an effort to
   re-diversify its political base as a choice political strategy should the
   AKP slip politically. However, this does not mean the FGC will burn
   bridges with the AKP. Rather, looking at the benefits of a symbiotic
   relationship with a powerful political party, the movement will continue
   to support the AKP. In fact, in the unlikely event of a future showdown
   between the military and the AKP, the FGC would quickly close ranks with
   the AKP as it did in 2007 when the military issued a warning against the
   AKP on its website.

   The FGC is perhaps the best organised grass roots movement in Turkey.
   Moreover, the group has a vast social and economic organisation,
   intelligence assets, a global network and a message that appeals to the
   West, even if that message appears to be mostly for international
   consumption. The FGC is effectively a third force in Turkish politics, and
   the world will hear a lot about it in the years to come.