VZCZCXYZ0030
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0478/01 2891612
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161612Z OCT 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0209
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000478 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR T, IO, ISN, EAP, AND INR/B 
DOE FOR NA-20, NE-6 
NSC FOR SAMORE, SCHEINMAN, HOLGATE, CONNERY 
NRC FOR OIP 
TOKYO FOR PEKO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2019 
TAGS:        
SUBJECT: IAEA: AMANO READY FOR PRIME TIME 
 
REF: A. STATE 91301 
      B. UNVIE 472 
      C. UNVIE 476 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Glyn Davies, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
 1. (SBU) In several meetings with USG officials before he 
departed Vienna at the end of the IAEA General Conference, 
DG-designate Amano displayed remarkable congruence of views 
with us on conducting the Agency's missions in safeguards 
verification, nuclear security, and promoting peaceful uses 
of the atom as well as on reforming Agency management. 
Latest information from the Japanese Mission is that Amano 
will return to Vienna in late November and occupy an office 
in the IAEA during his final, intensive preparation to assume 
office December 1.  This report responds directly to 
instruction ref A.  End Summary. 
 
DG of All States, But in Agreement with Us 
------------------------------------------ 
 
 2. (C) In a meeting with Ambassador on the eve of the 
two-week Board of Governors (BoG) and General Conference (GC) 
marathon of mid-September, IAEA Director General-designate 
Yukiya Amano thanked the U.S. for having supported his 
candidacy and took pains to emphasize his support for U.S. 
strategic objectives for the Agency.  Amano reminded 
Ambassador on several occasions that he would need to make 
concessions to the G-77, which correctly required him to be 
fair-minded and independent, but that he was solidly in the 
U.S. court on every key strategic decision, from high-level 
personnel appointments to the handling of Iran's alleged 
nuclear weapons program. 
 
 3. (SBU) Amano shared with Ambassador Davies his public 
stance on the role of the IAEA and the Agency's contribution 
to the global issues of proliferation, security, power, human 
health and water management.  More candidly, Amano noted the 
importance of maintaining a certain "constructive ambiguity" 
about his plans, at least until he took over for DG ElBaradei 
in December.  With a bow to the G-77, Amano felt obliged to 
emphasize the importance of "balance" regarding the Agency's 
work in peaceful uses of nuclear technology.  For staff 
morale reasons, Amano planned to work on improving the 
quality of management while publicly praising the current 
standards and commending staff members for their dedication. 
 
 4. (SBU) In the course of conversation, Amano was careful to 
highlight the April 12-13 Nuclear Security Summit in 
Washington as "the biggest event for me in the coming 
months."  The Summit coming in spring would drive his winter 
agenda, including events in Davos and the IAEA's March 
meeting of the Board of Governors.  Again for political 
considerations, Amano said he would balance visits to the 
U.S. with trips to South Africa, Egypt and Malaysia.  Were he 
not to secure the cooperation of these countries, Amano felt 
he would make little progress on top priorities upon taking 
office.  While acknowledging the increasing polarization 
between IAEA Member States, Amano was quick to point out 
areas of agreement, such as the need to upgrade the 
Seibersdorf laboratory complex, promote cancer therapy and 
safely introduce nuclear power.  Amano promised to "treat 
Iran with dignity," but followed up firmly with the claim 
that he had been granted the post of Director General "to 
implement safeguards."  He emphasized that Iran had specific 
obligations which the IAEA would enforce; he did not see 
himself as an intermediary between Iran and the rest of the 
world. 
 
Shaping IAEA Leadership 
----------------------- 
 
 5. (C) On staffing issues at the Deputy Director General 
(DDG) level, Amano stressed his pleasure that DDG for 
Management David Waller had agreed to stay on in his current 
position.  Amano described Waller as "an old friend, an 
effective manager and a good speaker."  Referring to his 
long-standing acquaintance with DDG for Safeguards Olli 
Heinonen, a manager he described as "reliable and 
professional," Amano had also planned to retain Heinonen in 
his current position.  He also intended to appoint another 
Russian to replace DDG for Nuclear Energy Sokolov.  Amano 
noted that DDG for Security and Safety Taniguchi would be 
leaving during the summer of 2010 (when his contract expired) 
and said he hoped to identify a "reliable person from a 
reliable country" to succeed Taniguchi.  Amano acknowledged 
that finding replacements for DDG Cetto (Technical 
Cooperation) and DDG Burkart (Nuclear Applications) would be 
trickier, as the jobs were rife with G-77 political 
considerations and he needed at least one DDG from a 
developing country.  Amano described the complex issue of 
staffing at the IAEA - from technical expertise to 
geographical representation and gender balance - as a "jigsaw 
puzzle."  He planned to appoint only one advisor from Japan, 
someone who was "not too visible."   (Note: From subsequent 
USG-GOJ consultations in Tokyo we know the individual in 
question to be Satoshi Suzuki, whom we expect to serve as 
Special Assistant to the Director General for Management. 
End Note.) 
 
Holding Agency to Verification 
Responsibilities, Not Politics 
------------------------------ 
 
 6. (C) Subsequently, White House WMD Coordinator Gary Samore 
and NSC Senior Director Laura Holgate met with Amano on 
September 15 on the margins of the General Conference.  Amano 
noted that he knows everyone will be focused on the March 
2010 Board of Governors meeting, his first as the new DG, to 
see what he does and says about Iran and Syria.  He affirmed 
it was most important for the IAEA to stick strictly to its 
verification responsibilities and not offer political 
"proposals" or "negotiations."  Amano said that he would 
insist Iran to implement fully all Safeguards obligations and 
extend full cooperation with the IAEA, although he does not 
believe Iran will completely change its current position of 
stalemate. 
 
 7. (C) Amano indicated he had begun reaching out to key 
individuals in the IAEA, seeking their advice on managing 
tough issues.  He said that, in particular, he had spoken to 
DDG Safeguards Olli Heinonen about whether or not the IAEA 
needed to change how the Iran and Syria reports were written. 
 Amano also reaffirmed to Dr. Samore that he plans to keep 
DDG Management David Waller and Heinonen in their current 
positions, especially as it is important to maintain some 
level of consistency and continuity with the turnover of a 
new DG. 
 
 8. (C) Amano echoed these themes in a September 16 meeting 
with U.S. NPT Special Representative Susan Burk.  Citing his 
own election, Amano noted warmly that "if you are determined, 
the U.S. can do anything!", and he hoped the U.S. also be a 
driving force in the NPT Revcon.  Asked about the need for 
increased IAEA authorities, Amano affirmed his commitment to 
keep pushing on the Additional Protocol.  He also argued for 
greater work on the back end of the fuel cycle, suggesting 
that it would be useful to develop something analogous to the 
IAEA multilateral fuel assurances arrangement that deals with 
waste issues while reassuring developing countries that "it's 
not just about new restrictions to be imposed." 
 
Winning 'em over, gradually 
--------------------------- 
 
 9. (SBU) Comment: By the time he departed Vienna with the 
GC's confirmation of his appointment, Amano appeared 
comfortable in his "Director General" shoes.  He speaks with 
increasing confidence and clarity, having mastered his 
talking points and grown accustomed to his new title. 
Apprehensions linger among IAEA staff and diplomatic missions 
regarding his communications and leadership abilities, but 
with his performance during the GC he made progress in 
winning over skeptics.  His wisdom in downplaying Japanese 
visibility among his senior advisors will also assuage staff 
fears that Amano would subvert the Agency with a Japanese 
corporate management style.  On a grander stage, Amano's 
global political savvy was clearly in evidence, and his 
willingness to speak candidly with U.S. interlocutors on his 
strategy and various balancing acts bodes well for our future 
relationship.  For example, his description of President 
Obama's Nuclear Security Summit as the biggest event of his 
early tenure was a deliberate and gratifying gesture. 
 
 10.  (U) Amano's conversations with Energy Secretary Chu and 
NRC Chairman Jaczko are reported refs B and C. 
 
 
DAVIES