VZCZCXYZ0002
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0348/01 2031515
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 221515Z JUL 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9853
RHEBAAA/DOE WASHDC C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000348 
 
SIPDIS 
 
ISN/RA, FOR, NEPHEW, NA-243, FOR, GOOREVICH, NA-241, FOR, 
O'CONNOR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2034 
TAGS:          
SUBJECT: IAEA/SAFEGUARDS: U.S. CONSULTANT DEVELOPS 
METHODOLOGY FOR STATE-LEVEL APPROACH TO ASSESS INDUSTRIAL 
INFRASTRUCTURES RELEVANT TO THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE 
 
REF: A. UNVIE VIENNA 197 
      B. UNVIE VIENNA 316 
      C. UNVIE VIENNA 334 
 
Classified By: CDA Geoffrey R. Pyatt for reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
 1. (C) Joyce (Ceil) van Berkel, a Sandia National 
Laboratories retiree and former U.S. cost-free expert to 
IAEA, carried out a two-week consultancy at the IAEA to help 
develop an analytic methodology for assessing a State,s 
industrial infrastructure that could be applicable to the 
nuclear fuel cycle.  The consultancy, funded as part of the 
U.S. Program for Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards 
(POTAS), supported the Division of Safeguards Information 
Management's (SGIM) efforts to provide analytic input to the 
IAEA's evolving state-level approach and assessment on 
drawing safeguards conclusions.  Van Berkel produced a draft 
methodology to assist SGIM analysts assigned to update and 
maintain state files and State Evaluation Reports (SERs).  A 
follow-on visit by van Berkel will likely be requested by the 
IAEA so that she can finish work related to extending the 
methodology for dual-use equipment and materials.  Comment: 
This work is one more example of U.S. support to IAEA 
safeguards analysis that is propelling the Agency's evolution 
toward an effective investigative, state-level approach to 
assuring the absence of undeclared activities in states with 
comprehensive safeguards agreements.  End comment and summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
Industrial Infrastructure Assessment Methodology Development 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
 
 2. (C) Van Berkel carried out the SGIM consultancy in June 
 2009.  This was the sixth such consultancy to take place 
since the U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards (USSP) and 
the IAEA reactivated their longstanding umbrella task on 
"Consultant Assistance on Information Collection and on 
Information Systems" (USSP Task D.137) last year (see also 
reftels - NOTAL).  Per the original IAEA request, van 
Berkel's consultancy focused on development of a methodology 
for SGIM analysts to use in order to review and assess 
industrial infrastructure in East Asian States.  Malaysia was 
selected by SGIM to use as a test case for purposes of 
developing the methodology.  Per standing guidance, Mission 
briefed van Berkel in advance on the importance of adhering 
to the agreed scope of work and advising Mission of any 
additional requests. 
 
 3.  (C) Per the IAEA's 2008 request, van Berkel was to 
develop a methodology which would be applicable to all states 
and which focused on the industrial infrastructure required 
to produce technology and equipment especially designed for 
nuclear fuel cycle facilities and activities.  (Comment: 
This work requires a diverse technical background with an 
emphasis on fuel cycle technologies, knowledge of IAEA 
Safeguards State Evaluation processes and goals, and 
information management skills.  Since few IAEA staff meet all 
these criteria, the task is well-suited for a consultancy. 
End Comment.)  Van Berkel produced a draft methodology and 
list of recommendations for improving the SGIM Information 
Analysis Unit,s (IAU) capabilities for conducting the 
assessments, as well as a list of factors which would be used 
to evaluate Safeguards Department assessment priorities. 
 
 4. (C) Van Berkel,s draft methodology assumes that the SGIM 
task officer would be familiar with what is already known 
about a state from previous IAEA state file collections and 
State Evaluation Reports related to industrial 
infrastructure.  The task officer would select an approach to 
the assessment that is based on whether or not a state file 
is being updated, what is found during a search for 
indicators of nuclear-related activities, the extent of 
declared nuclear fuel cycle activities in the state, and 
Safeguards Department priorities for the assessment.  For 
each of these cases, the methodology prescribes the general 
approach to be taken. 
 
 5. (C) SGIM officers and van Berkel planned follow-on 
activities before she departed Vienna.  First, SGIM officers 
will review and evaluate the draft methodology for assessing 
industrial infrastructure.  SGIM then plans to send the USSP 
a task extension request to complete the methodology and 
extend it to dual-use equipment and materials, as specified 
in the Annex to INFCIRC/254 part 2.  It is anticipated that 
 
 
this follow-on effort will require a four-week visit by van 
Berkel. 
 
 6. (C) Van Berkel stated that many analysts in SGIM have 
political science backgrounds and rely on tutorials and 
training to augment their technical understanding. She 
observed that there was good morale in SGIM, a big change 
from two years ago. 
 
 7.  (C) Comment.  The methodology van Berkel is developing is 
an important piece of the work Safeguards is undertaking to 
build sturdy and reliable processes for conducting state 
evaluations, an ongoing effort.  MsnOffs have been told by 
the Section Head of Safeguards Training that the state 
evaluation system is still not mature enough for 
incorporation into routine training for inspectors and 
analysts.  The technical consultancies described in reftels 
help to elevate the technical understanding of IAU staff and 
the skills they need to perform competent assessments.  A 
side benefit to these consultancies is that they provide a 
window for seeing in greater detail some of the issues the 
Secretariat is working and also measuring its progress.  End 
Comment. 
PYATT