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DE RUEHUNV #0343/01 1981406
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 171406Z JUL 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9843
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0239
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0895
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0732
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1252
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0740
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1108
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0271
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0253
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0006
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000343 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR P, T, S/SANAC, S/SEMEP, ISN - BURK 
ISN/MNSA, ISN/RA, IO/T 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2019 
TAGS:            
SUBJECT: IAEA/GC: ARAB GROUP APPEALS TO OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 
 
REF: A) UNVIE 326 B) UNVIE 333 C) 2008 UNVIE 546 
 
Classified By: CDA Geoffrey R. Pyatt for reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
  1. (C) A coterie of Vienna Arab Group Ambassadors (Lebanon, 
Egypt, Morocco and the Palestinian Authority) and the local 
Arab League (AL) representative appealed directly to Charge 
July 16 for U.S. support, or at least "understanding," of 
their draft IAEA General Conference resolution on "Israeli 
Nuclear Capabilities" (INC).  They shared the Arab League 
text (adopted by the Council of Ministers), which we had 
already received via other channels and transmitted to the 
Department.  In addition to making the usual arguments about 
the revised resolution being factual, benign and 
non-inflammatory, given that the word "threat" was dropped 
from the title last year, and no different from other UN 
resolutions on the subject, the Arab Group/AL hoped that the 
promise of "change" on the part of the Obama Administration 
would be reflected in our approach to this issue in Vienna. 
The only change in the INC resolution from last year was 
inclusion of a preambular reference to initiatives for a 
nuclear weapons free world, which, the AL ambassadors said, 
referred principally to President Obama's speech in Prague. 
The Arab Group/AL stressed dialogue rather than confrontation 
in the GC and sought to avoid another "no action motion," 
which they criticized as an undemocratic cut-off of debate on 
a substantive issue that went to the heart of their NPT 
adherence.  Lebanese Ambassador El-Khoury claimed that the 
U.S. could not count on EU support for "no action," as 
several EU countries were on "their side."  Egypt noted that 
even if we were to block the resolution again this year, the 
issue would be back again to haunt us next year. 
 
 2. (C) Charge assured the Arab Group of our desire for 
consensus rather than confrontation, i.e., that we would 
prefer not to resort to parliamentary tactics and would not 
stand in the way of a fulsome discussion.  He acknowledged 
that the issue the Arab Group raises with its resolution 
cannot be wished away but should be "managed" in a way that 
respects all of our principles.  Charge underlined the 
centrality of nonproliferation, NPT universality and 
multilateral cooperation to the Obama Administration.  He 
counseled a holistic approach to nonproliferation in the 
Middle East, noting the important concerns of all our 
governments regarding Iran's program, but the Arab Group 
representatives rejected any conflation of Israel and Iran 
nuclear issues.  They recalled how Arab Board members had 
supported Iran's referral to the UNSC in 2006.  The issue was 
not one of condoning Iran's actions, the Egyptian DCM argued, 
but of condoning Israel's position by omission, and though he 
professed to understand our reluctance to hold Israel 
accountable (i.e. for its nuclear arsenal), this bred 
resentment among those in the Arab world who regret not 
having nuclear weapons.  Egyptian Ambassador Fawzi also 
compared the INC to the annual GC resolution on DPRK, 
intimating that the same rationale applied to both and that 
the DPRK resolution could be held hostage to the INC debate. 
Fawzi and other Arab Group Ambassadors defended their "right" 
to bring the INC to a vote. 
 
 3. (C) Egypt's active participation in the meeting was 
particularly notable, as was Syria's absence.  Underlining 
that he was uninstructed and had no answers, Charge observed 
that the introduction of two related resolutions, the one on 
Middle East Safeguards (MES) and that on INC, had resulted in 
frustration and "no winners" in the past, and he posited that 
our respective interests in the Agency could be served by 
adopting a different framework.  Without making any 
commitments as to the Egyptian text, Fawzi asked pointedly, 
if Egypt did not introduce its MES resolution this year, what 
would the U.S. position be "for the sake of consensus" on the 
INC?  Charge declined to speculate on a U.S. position on the 
hypothetical question of a stand-alone INC resolution in the 
absence of instructions, but undertook to put the question to 
Washington for consideration. (Comment:  This may not have 
been just posturing on Fawzi's part.  The fact that Egypt 
appears to be playing, for the first time in recent years, a 
negotiating role on the part of the Arab Group/AL, and has 
not circulated an MES text this year may signal a tactical 
shift to lead with the INC.  Egypt and other Arab group 
members noted their strong objections to Israeli amendments 
to the 2008 MES resolution, in particular with respect to the 
precedence of the peace process as prerequisite for a NWFZ. 
Charge cited the vote on last year's amendment as evidence 
that many governments share the U.S. view on the relationship 
between the peace process and a MENWFZ. "Where is this peace 
process you talk about ?," the Egyptian Ambassador 
interjected, "I don't see it." Still scathed from last year, 
Egypt could decide to not submit its MES text and revert to 
the situation prior to introduction of the Egyptian MES 
resolution in the mid-1990s with the INC being the only 
resolution on the table.  Another Egyptian ploy might be to 
let a confrontation unfold over the INC (as Egypt would 
expect strong opposition to INC), and then re-introduce as a 
"compromise" the MES resolution without the Israeli 
amendments adopted in 2008. End Comment.) 
 
 4. (C) Comment Contd.: While their tactics may be evolving, 
the Arab Group appeal for U.S. leadership and cooperation is 
similar to previous years.  However, Egypt's participation in 
the meeting on the INC resolution is a departure from 
previous years in which Cairo postured itself at arms-length 
from the AL-led text; Egypt's involvement at this stage 
underlies our speculation that Cairo is adjusting its tactics 
vis--vis the ordering and linkage of texts.  The Arabs had 
not yet met with the EU, Canada or others, despite Canadian 
overtures to the AL in Cairo.  End Comment. 
 
 5. (C) We learned in a separate July 14 brainstorming session 
with like-minded experts (Canada, U.S., EU, UK, and New 
Zealand) that Arab League SYG Moussa had written individually 
to EU members on the INC, and the EU Presidency is seeking to 
coordinate a response.  The UK confirmed our expectation that 
while they may revert "by default" to a common position on a 
"no action" motion, EU states would likely splinter on an 
up-or-down vote on the INC.  The Swedish EU Presidency 
reported that in preliminary discussions, EU Ambassadors had 
accorded the Presidency broad negotiating authority and were 
inclined to treat the MES and INC resolutions separately and 
on their "own merits," an approach we and Canada discouraged 
if there was to be any prospect of a new consensus "package." 
 Canada saw no prospect for revival of the old consensus and 
expected to receive similar instructions this year as it did 
last -- to call for "no action" provided there was a 
reasonable chance for success -- but believed chances were 
"unreasonable" and will so advise Ottawa.  UK assessed that 
there was no chance of winning a "no action" motion even with 
EU support.  Albeit also uninstructed, Canada strongly 
encouraged the notion of a possible consensus approach based 
on a single resolution, calling this exactly the kind of "new 
think" that was warranted.  Canada noted that the substantive 
convergence between the MES (now more about a NWFZ than 
safeguards) and INC texts over the years supported the logic 
of a single resolution.  U.K. and EU counterparts were also 
enthused and the U.K. recommended a direct U.S. approach in 
Cairo.  We underlined the need for a united front in Vienna 
among the likeminded and they encouraged the U.S. to take the 
pen on a single resolution.  Everyone recognized that this 
may or may not work, and would depend on the Arab end-game 
with respect to the NPT Revcon (which is not clear), but we 
agreed it was worth trying even for tactical reasons to 
demonstrate our flexibility vis--vis the Arab Group. 
Like-minded experts also speculated about rumors of an 
Iranian-introduced agenda item on Israeli strikes against 
nuclear facilities, but judging from our discussion with the 
Arab League Ambassadors (who did not mention it), there is no 
evidence of appetite among the Arabs for aligning with Iran 
on that suggestion. 
 
 6. (C) Guidance Request: From our soundings thus far in 
Vienna, a new consensus premised on a single resolution (ref 
a) seems to be our best option for attempting to identify a 
new framework for dealing with the Middle East that avoids 
another GC showdown.  We may very well lose such a showdown 
this year (the "no action" vote), and we hope to avoid 
burdening the new Board after the General Conference with the 
acrimonious tone of what is invariably the final issue dealt 
with at the GC.  Before pursuing a single resolution 
approach, including with Israeli counterparts, Mission will 
wait for guidance, as requested ref a.  Egypt's renewed 
re-engagement in the Arab League, after taking a hands-off 
approach and rejecting "linkage" the last few years, could be 
turned to our advantage should Washington deem a new 
initiative for a single resolution text worth pursuing, 
including via high-level bilateral approaches in Cairo as 
suggested ref a.  Charge is scheduled to see Swedish 
Ambassador (EU Presidency) on Tuesday, July 21 and would 
benefit from initial Washington guidance also for that 
conversation. 
PYATT