Cable by Dazzlepod US Embassy Diplomatic Cables from WikiLeaks Released 251287 Cables (Sep 2, 2012)  ·  About
ORIGIN Donate by Bitcoin: 1LtADcWuX3Fn38GVrfAq73Mu1a7gtfzKGP
CONFIDENTIAL (97070)
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN (4678)
SECRET (11322)
SECRET//NOFORN (4330)
UNCLASSIFIED (75792)
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (58095)
Reference ID 09RANGOON223 (original text)
SubjectBURMA: REVISED TRIPARTITE CORE GROUP TO HAVE NO
OriginEmbassy Rangoon
ClassificationCONFIDENTIAL
ReleasedAug 30, 2011 01:44
CreatedApr 10, 2009 05:38
VZCZCXRO5133
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHGO #0223/01 1000538
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 100538Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY RANGOON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8870
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 2872
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2241
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0149
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0717
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1898
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 0291
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 5167
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2103
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 5376
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 0787
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0610
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0189
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 8969
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0184
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 0734
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6545
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 1757
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 2128
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA 0605
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2363
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 4374
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000223 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS; INR/EAP 
BANGKOK FOR USAID 
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO USAID/AME 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2019 
TAGS:            
SUBJECT: BURMA: REVISED TRIPARTITE CORE GROUP TO HAVE NO 
VISA AUTHORITY 
 
REF: RANGOON 175 
 
RANGOON 00000223  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: P/E Chief Jennifer Harhigh for Reasons 1.4 (b and d). 
 
Summary 
-------- 
 
 1.  (C)  The UN Resident Coordinator in Burma has clarified 
that, under new Government of Burma (GOB) rules, the 
Tripartite Core Group (TCG) has no visa-authorization powers, 
not even for ASEAN or the UN.  All visa requests for Cyclone 
Nargis related activities must now be approved by the GOB's 
Foreign Affairs Policy Committee (FAPC) in Nay Pyi Taw, 
although procedures for UN and ASEAN visas differ from those 
for INGOs.  The new policy does not specifically address 
donor visas.  The FAPC has been notoriously slow to process 
visas in the past; so presumably the GOB's revised policy 
will inhibit donor travel.  Reportedly, GOB officials have 
confirmed that the intent is to limit severely the ability of 
foreigners to visit the Delta in the lead-up to 2010 
elections.  End Summary. 
 
All visa requests to FAPC -- a slow process 
------------------------------------------- 
 
 2.  (C)  At an April 9 meeting, UN Resident Coordinator 
(UNRC) Bishow Parajuli briefed donors on continuing 
discussions with Burmese government officials about the 
revised visa policy for Cyclone Nargis-related travel. 
Parajuli said that, under the new policy, an INGO will submit 
visa requests to the line ministry with which it has an MOU. 
The relevant line ministry will process all supporting 
documentation and endorse the visa request prior to 
consideration by the FAPC, which will make a final decision. 
The FAPC meets weekly.  Parajuli said a GOB April 3 letter 
about the procedure for UN and ASEAN visa requests is 
technically accurate (reftel).  All UN and ASEAN visa 
requests will be "handled" by the TCG, which will process the 
supporting documentation and "endorse" the visa request to 
the FAPC which will make all final decisions. 
 
Motive: restrict pre-election access for donors 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
 3.  (C)  Subsequent to an April 6-7 TCG meeting in which UN 
and ASEAN reps urged the GOB to reinstate the TCG's visa 
authorities, Parajuli met with the Minister of Social Welfare 
(MSW) who explicitly linked the visa policy to the regime's 
desire to limit foreigners' access to and presence in the 
Delta in the run-up to 2010 elections.  The Minister admitted 
that the new policy is in essence a reversion to pre-Nargis 
procedures.  He offered assurance that INGOS that have MOUs 
with his ministry would receive prompt recommendations to the 
FAPC.  He acknowledged, though, that service would depend 
greatly on an organization's relationship with its respective 
line ministry.  In a separate meeting, the Foreign Minister 
confirmed to Parajuli that the new policy originated "from 
the top" and stemmed from various line ministries' concern 
that the TCG was approving visas without their input or 
 
RANGOON 00000223  002.8 OF 002 
 
 
concurrence. 
 
Plenty of complications 
----------------------- 
 
 4.  (C)  Parajuli and other UN officials continue to hope the 
GOB will have to reconsider once the FAPC realizes the volume 
of requests.  According to Parajuli, the TCG reviewed and 
approved 3,600 visa in the last ten months, approximately 12 
requests per day.  Current estimates of the visa backlog 
since the policy change in early March range from 100 to more 
than 200.  The new policy requires additional paperwork and 
documentation for each visa request, in addition to the FAPC 
approval.  Also, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has 
requested staff lists and temporary duty rosters of all 
Nargis-related employees from diplomatic missions, the UN, 
ASEAN and INGOs.  Parajuli pledged to continue to raise 
concerns about the operational implications of the new 
policy, and he indicated that the UN Secretary General will 
raise this issue with Prime Minister Thein Sein when they 
meet at the ASEAN summit. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
 5.  (C)  While initial reports of the April 3 revised policy 
appeared to be a small improvement from the major setback to 
TCG visa powers of early March, the new clarifications make 
clear that the problem remains and the policy is indeed 
intended to inhibit the ability of foreign donors to visit 
the Delta, at least until the 2010 elections.  It is not at 
all obvious that an avalanche of additional visa-requests to 
the FAPC will cause the GOB to blink.  After all, the 
apparent intent is to slow visa issuance.  The most obvious 
lever would be for foreign donors, asked via the TCG's 
PONREPP process to expand funding for post-cyclone recovery 
operations, to insist that the GOB relent on TCG visa powers 
before new funds flow.  The worry is that, given a choice 
between controlling the pre-election environment and meeting 
the Delta population's pressing needs, the regime would opt 
for control, leaving donors no attractive options. 
DINGER
This website hosts an archive of all 251,287 US Embassy diplomatic cables that were released by WikiLeaks between November 28, 2010 and September 2, 2011.

While the cables are generally available at http://wikileaks.org/cablegate.html, we find it hard to search or even navigate the site to read the cables.

We have made all 251,287 cables available here at Dazzlepod with the hope to make it easier for readers to browse, search, share and discuss about the released cables.

The cables are periodically selected and posted to our Twitter page and Facebook page for readers to review them.

For comments or questions, please do not hesitate to contact us at wikileaks@dazzlepod.com.

- Dazzlepod