VZCZCXRO6437
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDM #0033/01 0081547
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 081547Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5792
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000033 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/I, NEA/IR; NSC FOR MCDERMOTT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2019 
TAGS:                
SUBJECT: SYRIAN MP DISCUSSES "SHARED" U.S.-SYRIAN GOALS FOR 
IRAQ 
 
DAMASCUS 00000033  001.3 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4(b,d) 
 
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Summary 
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 1. (C) A veteran 14-year Syrian MP with diverse business 
holdings told us the primary obstacle to trade with Iraq is 
no longer insufficient security, but habitually delinquent 
Iraqi payments.  The MP related a recent discussion with 
Syrian Ambassador to Baghdad Nawaf al-Fares, in which 
al-Fares claimed to have complained to President Asad about 
his lack of access to Iraqi PM Maliki and the generally cool 
reception with which he is met by all GOI officials.  The MP 
expressed disappointment that Syrian-Iraqi economic relations 
had not progressed more smoothly following high-level GOI 
visits in 2007.  On U.S.-Syrian relations, the MP posited 
that Syria and the U.S. had common desires for a stable, 
multi-confessional Iraq -- desires that stood in stark 
contrast to Iran's objectives.  He suggested that Iraq might 
be an appropriate issue upon which to start building a better 
U.S.-Syrian relationship, but insisted that the U.S. must 
"make the first move."  End summary. 
 
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Visa Delay Prompts Rare Request for Meeting 
----------------------- 
 
 2. (C) MP Hashem Akkad (strictly protect) requested a meeting 
with us to discuss his brother Samer,s NIV status, which has 
been pending an SAO clearance since June 2008.  The 14-year 
independent parliamentarian told us he had recently returned 
from nearly a year in France, where he had sought treatment 
for a rare form of cancer.  Appearing thin and coughing 
frequently, Akkad discussed a range of topics including the 
business climate in Syria, his business interests in Iraq, 
the Syrian Ambassador to Iraq,s recent visit to Damascus, 
and possible next steps in the U.S.-Syrian relationship. 
 
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Trade with Iraq Tough, but Improving 
--------------------- 
 
 3. (C) Akkad described his family business interests in Iraq, 
which include a contract to service a nationalized Iraqi oil 
field near Basrah, as difficult but improving.  He claimed to 
have lost over 200 trucks full of building materials to 
hijackers over the past five years ) primarily on the road 
from the al-Tanf border crossing to Baghdad.  Roadside 
bandits were less of a concern today than receiving payment, 
he said.  His Iraqi customers ) including the Iraqi 
government ) normally paid five months after he had 
delivered goods or services, and sometimes didn,t pay at 
all.  When asked if the late payment could be blamed on 
problems transferring money into Syria, he said no, that the 
Iraqi Bank for Trade and Finance in Baghdad had a branch in 
Beirut that was very reliable.  He said the main problem was 
a culture of &blackmail8 that pervaded Iraqi commerce. 
Despite the payment problems, he expressed optimism that his 
reputation as one of Iraq,s most reliable suppliers would 
prove very lucrative in the years ahead as Iraq,s security 
situation improved. 
 
 4. (C) Regarding the business climate in Syria, Akkad smiled 
at the suggestion that recent &reforms8 were changing the 
economic landscape.  He characterized the body of reform 
legislation as merely superficial changes that would not 
decrease corruption or negate the necessity of having 
politically influential business partners or patrons in order 
to succeed.  (Note: Akkad,s family owns the Fiorella Pasta 
manufacturing plant, the Crush and Canada Dry bottling 
facility, and are partners in major restaurant and rental car 
ventures.  End note.) 
 
------------------------------ 
Syrian Ambassador Doesn't Feel Welcome in Baghdad 
------------------------------ 
 
 5. (C) Akkad said that he had spoken with Syrian Ambassador 
to Iraq Nawaf al-Fares when the Ambassador had visited 
Damascus over the holidays. Fares had apparently complained 
to President Asad that he had only been granted one meeting 
with Iraqi PM Maliki since his arrival some four months ago, 
and that had been a brief, perfunctory meeting of no 
 
DAMASCUS 00000033  002.3 OF 002 
 
 
substance.  According to Akkad, Fares was also unhappy with 
how coolly he had been received by GOI officials at all 
levels, and had asked Asad what he was supposed to be doing 
in Baghdad if the Iraqis were unwilling to work with him. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Syria and Iran at Odds Over Iraq 
-------------------------------- 
 
 6. (C) Akkad dismissed high-level Iraqi ministerial visits to 
Damascus in 2007, saying that the Iraqis had not fulfilled 
any of the promises made during those visits regarding 
greater economic cooperation.  Pol/Econ Chief suggested that 
the Iraqis were equally disappointed that Syria had not kept 
its promise to stop the flow of foreign fighters entering 
Iraq from Syria and cooperate closely with the Iraqi 
government on security issues.  Akkad protested that Syria 
had sent an ambassador to Iraq as a sign of its desire for 
better relations, but that Iraq had not reciprocated.  Akkad 
claimed that Syria's policy towards Iraq had a similar goal 
as the U.S. -- for Iraq to become a stable, 
multi-confessional state and not an Iranian-dominated Shi,a 
state.  He suggested that Iraq might prove the easiest 
foundation to start building a better U.S.-Syrian 
relationship, and that Syria,s differences with Iran over 
Iraq might offer the U.S. an opening. 
 
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Pondering an Improved U.S.-Syrian Relationship 
--------------------------------- 
 
 7. (C) Clearly enjoying the opportunity to talk politics with 
Emboffs, Akkad asked how the U.S.-Syria relationship might 
improve under the Obama administration.  He posited that the 
Obama administration could start off on the right foot with 
Asad by de-listing Syria from the State Sponsors of Terrorism 
-- "as you did with Korea" -- and lifting economic sanctions 
against Syria.  He revealed that he met SMI Chief Assef 
Shawqat on a weekly basis for coffee, and that Shawqat was 
upset about his designation to the OFAC list, even though he 
had no assets in the U.S. financial system.  He offered to 
pass to Shawqat any suggestions for how the relationship 
might improve. 
 
 8. (C)  Akkad suggested that President-elect Obama could send 
a U.S. Ambassador to Damascus and in return, the Syrians 
might re-open DCS.  Pol/Econ Chief countered that DCS and the 
construction of a new embassy were low-level issues that 
should be resolved before any new U.S. Ambassador could be 
sent to Syria, in order for a future ambassador to be able to 
work on items of greater importance.  Akkad replied that 
confidence-building measures would be important, but insisted 
that it was the Americans who must make the first move. 
Pol/Econ Chief asked Akkad whether Syria was serious about 
improving relations and whether we could report to Washington 
that Syrian officials might be considering more Syrian 
cooperation on Iraqi security, less Syrian intervention in 
internal Lebanese affairs, and whether Syria would be ready 
to diminish reliance on relations with Iran and Hizballah in 
pursuit of a peace agreement with Israel.  Akkad smiled and 
said it was positive to be exchanging frank views. 
 
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Comment 
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 9. (C) Akkad, once a close Embassy contact, has been out of 
circulation for nearly two years.  His willingness to receive 
us contrasts starkly with the cold shoulder we have received 
from many of our regular contacts.  Akkad's assertion that 
the U.S. must "make the first move" towards a better 
relationship with Syria reflects a commonly held position 
among politically-minded Syrians. 
CONNELLY