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FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
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INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0173
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 003347
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/11/12
TAGS:
SUBJECT: COLOMBIA'S CLOUDY ELECTIONS PANORAMA
REF: A) BOGOTA 2833; B) BOGOTA 3145; C) BOGOTA 3047; D) BOGOTA 2772
E) BOGOTA 3097; F) BOGOTA 3269; G) BOGOTA 3408
CLASSIFIED BY: Brian A. Nichols, DCM; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
SUMMARY
-------
1. (SBU) As the May 30, 2010 presidential election draws nearer,
campaigns have begun and the field of candidates is slowly being
whittled down. However, the potential referendum to allow
President Uribe to run for a third term combined with missing
electoral rules of the game (especially regarding campaign finance)
have created an atmosphere of uncertainty that dominates the
Colombian political landscape. This uncertainty also affects the
March 14 national legislative elections, in which Colombians will
select the entire Senate and House. If President Uribe does not
run for reelection, the eight candidates listed below currently
stand the best chance to succeed him. The Ambassador is meeting
with the candidates individually to learn their policy priorities
and ensure continued bilateral cooperation. Given the vast
popularity of Uribe and his policies, nearly all candidates include
a continuation of his "Democratic Security" in their platforms plus
a wide range of social and economic proposals. Since a third of
Congress has been or is under investigation for having received
funding from paramilitary and criminal groups, pre-election
monitoring and campaign finance transparency will likely be keys to
successful elections in 2010. Post plans to participate in
monitoring efforts, and will pay special attention to post-conflict
consolidation areas. End Summary.
THE SHADOW OF AN URIBE THIRD TERM
---------------------------------
2. (SBU) The proposed referendum to again modify the constitution
to allow President Uribe to seek a second reelection was initiated
through the submission of citizens' signatures, and not by the
Congress or the Executive. The Congress approved the referendum
bill on September 2, but the process by which it was initiated and
approved is currently under review by the Constitutional Court (ref
A). Court President Nilson Pinilla told the media on October 22
that the Court's final ruling would not come until next year, with
politicians estimating a February decision. Even if the Court
allows the referendum to proceed, the timeline to organize the
actual referendum vote and mobilize the electorate will be tight.
Mario Solano, Secretary General of Uribe's "U" Party, told us on
October 21 that March 7 is the current target date to hold the
referendum. Presidential contenders will not know whether they
will face the formidable Uribe, who has maintained 70% approval
ratings, until just two months before the presidential elections.
The Uribe specter not only affects opposition strategies, but also
pro-Uribe candidates who have a hard time campaigning aggressively
while Uribe's hopes remain alive.
3. (SBU) Further complicating matters, President Uribe has yet to
declare his intentions clearly. Uribe's Delphic comments, seeking
a complete continuation of his policies but noting the desirability
of change in presidential leadership, seem to be part of a strategy
to paint the referendum as "the will of the people" and not the
President's ambition, thus distancing Uribe from other Latin
American leaders who have perpetuated themselves in power. Uribe's
silence has led to rampant speculation over whether he intends to
run, with some saying that his Administration and party have
expended so much political capital on the referendum that he
clearly wants reelection badly, and others hoping that Uribe's
conscience is telling him that a 12-year presidency would be bad
for Colombian democracy (ref B). Even if Uribe does not run, by
keeping the referendum possibility alive, he is avoiding lame-duck
status and further consolidating control over the Congress and
other institutions.
4. (C) Whatever his intentions, Uribe can not easily declare
himself a candidate while the constitution prohibits a third term.
Under the "Law of Guarantees" developed four years ago when Uribe
was allowed to run for a second term, a sitting president must
declare his/her candidacy six months before elections (November 30
in this case) and abide by rules intended to minimize the advantage
a sitting president has in campaigning. The referendum will not be
held before November 30, so Uribe faces a legal conundrum: he can
not declare his candidacy because the constitution prohibits a
third term, but he is required to declare his candidacy six months
before the election. Theories abound as to how Team Uribe will
overcome this next hurdle, including that the deadline will be
ignored by arguing that the referendum is a "higher law" or that
Uribe will make a conditional declaration to meet the deadline:
"if the referendum is approved, I will be a candidate." The
current preference, according to Solano, is to have Congress
eliminate the deadline given the circumstances (Comment: This
seems unlikely since only three weeks remain to get this change
through the legislature. End comment). In order to avoid further
legal traps, Solano told us that President Uribe will voluntarily
comply with the other restrictions imposed by the Law of
Guarantees, even if he is not yet an official candidate. However,
Uribe has not yet made any formal commitment to clear up this grey
area.
VOID IN ELECTORAL RULES
-----------------------
5. (SBU) Besides the push for the referendum, the most common
complaint we hear from candidates and political parties is that
Congress has yet to approve the implementing law to regulate
political reforms passed earlier this year. This means, for
example, that candidates do not know the campaign finance rules
(including how much funding they can receive from the government),
the penalties for receiving support from criminal groups, how
transportation for elections will be organized, the rules for
interparty primaries, or if there will be a quota of women that
must be included in party lists for congressional elections. A
joint Senate/House committee is currently attempting to reach
agreement on an implementing law that will be presented to the full
Congress for a vote, but the fact that nearly all legislators are
candidates themselves has made consensus difficult and will weaken
sanctions for wrongdoing.
6. (C) Opposition parties are also wary of ruling coalition
attempts to skew the rules of the game in their favor. For that
reason, presidential candidate Rafael Pardo said on October 27 that
his Liberal Party would boycott the vote on the implementing law.
Uribe opponents also decry the uncertainty in the application of
the Law of Guarantees to the President if he indeed becomes a
candidate. High-ranking Alternative Democratic Pole Party (Polo or
PDA) officials complained to us on October 21 that Uribe uses his
near-weekly town halls and media appearances for campaigning, and
admitted that Uribe was likely to win the referendum and then the
election by a landslide. They added that Uribe's team used the
party switching period allowed in the reform (ref C) to buy votes
for the reelection referendum. The uncertainty in the rules of the
game with national elections in March and May especially hinders
planning by Colombia's smaller parties and independent candidates
(see ref D for election calendar and mechanics). Green Party
presidential pre-candidate Antanas Mockus lamented on October 27
that his campaign depends on state funding and that legislators may
reduce funding to parties that obtain a low number of votes in
elections.
TOP 4 PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDERS
FROM OPPOSITION PARTIES
-----------------------------
7. (C) Out of the opposition and independent candidates hoping to
succeed Uribe, these four, listed alphabetically, stand the best
chance of making it to the final ballot:
-- Sergio Fajardo: Fajardo, a math professor who was an
extraordinarily popular mayor of Medellin, spent the past five
months collecting 700,000 signatures (twice the required number) to
run as an independent candidate. He hopes to duplicate Uribe's
independent feat in 2002. However, Fajardo has the lowest
nationwide name recognition among the leading candidates (52-68%).
He has already campaigned in all of Colombia's 32 departments and
placed fourth in a late-September nationwide Ipsos poll, but is
having a hard time competing with party machineries. Fajardo is
more popular in large cities; a Gallup poll conducted October
27-November 3 in Colombia's four largest cities gave him 16 points
more in name recognition, 17 more points in favorability (improving
over time) and 9 points less unfavorability than the nationwide
Ipsos poll conducted at the end of September. The good news for
Fajardo is that he has very low unfavorability ratings, so if he
can get publicity, he should climb in the polls. He is especially
popular with women voters. The Gallup poll has him in a
statistical tie for first with Juan Manuel Santos in all election
scenarios that exclude Uribe. Fajardo may be lured into a
coalition with another candidate.
-- Antanas Mockus: Mockus --a colorful, outside-the-box math
professor (like Fajardo) and two-time mayor of Bogota-- is the
leading candidate from the small Green Party. Though he is very
popular with Bogota's citizens and has the highest name recognition
of all the candidates, he stands virtually no chance of winning the
presidency and will likely seek to join a coalition. Mockus ran
against Uribe in 2006, receiving only 1.24% of total votes cast
(4th place), and was Noemi Sanin's running mate in 1998 (they came
in third, with 26.77% of total votes cast). Mockus said on October
27 that he is worried about the availability of state campaign
funding and hopes to not be excluded from presidential debates.
Only 4% of likely voters chose him in the Ipsos poll (7th place of
the 8 candidates listed here). Like Fajardo, Mockus is much more
popular in large cities (highest favorability rating of all
candidates with 54% in Gallup poll) than nationwide (highest
unfavorable rating of all candidates with 44% in the Ipsos poll).
-- Rafael Pardo: Pardo, a former Minister of Defense, Senator and
Peace Commissioner, emerged from a crowded field to win the
opposition Liberal Party (PL) primaries. He represents the
center-left moderates in the party, led by former president Cesar
Gaviria who controls the party machinery. Pardo unsuccessfully
tried to win the PL's nomination in 2006. Though the center-left,
traditional PL has the most-developed party structure throughout
the country and the largest number of members, turnout in its
primaries was disappointing (ref E). The low turnout was
interpreted by analysts as yet another sign of voter preference for
Uribe and his policies, and rival Conservative Party (PC) leaders
are sure the PC will do very well against the PL in 2010. Pardo
and the PL actively oppose the reelection referendum, and are
considering coalitions with German Vargas (Pardo belonged to the
Radical Change Party for a couple of years), Gustavo Petro or
others. Pardo tied for fifth (out of eight) in the Ipsos poll and
placed fifth (out of seven, Mockus was excluded) in the Gallup
poll. He placed in the bottom three in name recognition and
favorability ratings in both polls.
-- Gustavo Petro: Petro is the candidate from the opposition Polo.
The five-year-old Polo, a conglomeration of small parties
(including communists), represents Colombia's legitimate political
far left. Petro surprisingly defeated farther-left party president
Carlos Gaviria in the Polo primaries (ref E). In the best
performance ever for Colombia's left, Gaviria came in second to
Uribe in the 2006 elections with 22% of the vote. Petro represents
the moderate faction of the Polo. Given Petro's victory, the Polo
is currently selecting a new party president and secretary-general,
and trying to reach agreement on a party platform. The Polo is the
only major party to oppose the U.S.-Colombia Defense Cooperation
Agreement (DCA), and many of its members support Venezuelan
President Hugo Chavez (an albatross given that Chavez is the most
unpopular person in Colombia, with 88% unfavorable ratings in the
Gallup poll). Other candidates are concerned that Polo will
receive funding or other support from Venezuela. Despite having
very low favorability and very high unfavorability ratings (worst
in Gallup and second worst in Ipsos polls), Petro placed in a
three-way tie for first (Ipsos) and tied for third (Gallup) in
voter intent. The Polo hopes to form an anti-Uribe coalition with
the PL or others.
TOP 4 PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDERS
FROM THE GOVERNING COALITION
-----------------------------
8. (C) These are the four candidates, listed alphabetically, from
parties that support Uribe's policies in Congress who stand the
best chance of making it to the final ballot:
-- Andres Felipe Arias: Arias is a pre-candidate from the
traditional, center-right Conservative Party (PC). He was Minister
of Agriculture under President Uribe, and is known as "Uribito"
because of his close relationship with the President, their shared
political views and his physical resemblance to a younger Uribe.
Arias has steadfastly maintained that the PC should not put forth a
candidate if President Uribe runs. If Uribe does not run, Arias
would like to join forces with Santos for the elections. Arias was
ahead of Noemi Sanin, his top competitor for the PC nod (primaries
may occur on March 14), until he became embroiled in the Agro
Ingreso Seguro scandal where wealthy landowners and political
contributors received too many funds from the GOC's irrigation
subsidy program. Arias' newfound notoriety could very well cost
him party support. He was in a three-way tie for first in voter
intent in the September Ipsos poll (with the lowest unfavorable
rating of any candidate), but dropped to sixth (out of seven) in
the November Gallup poll, where for the first time, respondents who
had an unfavorable image of him outnumbered those with a favorable
opinion. Comparing May and November Gallup polls, Arias' name
recognition rose 11 points, his favorable rating dropped 8 points
and his unfavorable rating rose a whopping 18 points. At age 36,
Arias may have to wait to try his luck until 2014. On the other
hand, he told the Ambassador on November 10 that he now has more
supporters in the House and Senate than Sanin, that legislators do
not want to oppose Uribe, and that the fact that that the PC
primaries are scheduled for the same day as congressional elections
should help Arias as congressional candidates will campaign on his
behalf. Arias sees Petro --who he described as smart, politically
shrewd, persuasive, and backed by a segment of the political
machinery-- as the biggest threat to governing coalition
candidates, followed by Fajardo --who he described as publicly
popular but lacking a substantive platform and party machinery.
-- Noemi Sanin: As a former foreign minister (the first female FM
in Latin America) and Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Spain and
Venezuela, the charming Sanin is a household name respected for her
foreign policy prowess. However, she does not have a strong party
base, was unsuccessful in presidential bids in 1998 (3rd place as
an independent, 26.77% of total vote) and 2002 (4th place as an
independent, 5.8% of total vote), and does not yet have a solid
domestic platform. This time she is running as a pre-candidate for
the PC, but is not a staunch party militant. Sanin believes the PC
should present a candidate even if Uribe runs. Some Conservatives
have criticized her for alternating between praise and condemnation
of Uribe (e.g., accusing him of having paramilitary support and of
buying the reelection referendum). Sanin is competing with Arias
for the PC nod, and is now the favorite to win as she has never
been implicated in a major scandal. However, PC insiders told us
that Sanin was not a true conservative and many conservatives would
support Santos if she won the PC primary. She has alienated Santos
and Arias, but the Polo president and secretary-general told us
October 21 that they could agree to a coalition with her. Although
Sanin had the second-best image in the Ipsos poll, she only placed
fifth in voter intent. From March 2008 to November 2009, her
favorable rating has dropped from 70 to 53% and her unfavorable
rating has increased from 13 to 30% in the Gallup poll. She tied
for third with Petro in voter intent in the November 2009 Gallup
poll, behind Fajardo and Santos.
-- Juan Manuel Santos: Santos, President Uribe's former Defense
Minister, is Uribe's "U" Party candidate if Uribe does not run.
His website is www.sinoesuribeesjuanmanuelsantos.com ("if it's not
Uribe, it's Juan Manuel Santos"), and his main slogan is
"reelection or Santos." Santos plans to continue Uribe's
security-focused policies. Santos had the best public image of all
candidates in the Ipsos poll and joined Mockus and Sanin atop the
Gallup poll. He was in a three-way tie for first in voter intent
in the Ipsos poll and tied with Fajardo for first in the Gallup
poll. If the elections were held today without Uribe, Santos would
most likely win. However, the relatively new "U" Party depends
heavily on President Uribe's popularity, does not have a
well-developed nation-wide party structure and is suffering
financial shortfalls. An alliance with the PC would make the most
sense, but Santos and Sanin do not get along. See ref F for a
readout of the Ambassador's October 23 lunch with Santos.
-- German Vargas Lleras: Vargas is the president of the Radical
Change Party (CR), a pro-Uribe spinoff of the PL and part of the
pro-Uribe congressional majority coalition. Although he supported
Uribe's second term, Vargas strongly believes a constitutional
modification permitting a third term would be undemocratic. Arias
described Vargas as the natural successor to continue Uribe's
security policies until Vargas destroyed his chances by opposing
Uribe's reelection. Vargas' opposition of the reelection
referendum dashed his hopes of joining forces with the "U" Party
and forced some congressmen to leave his party for the "U" or PC
(ref C). His fall from grace is reflected in the polls, with only
3% of likely voters picking Vargas in the Ipsos poll and 6% in the
Gallup poll (last place in both polls out of the eight candidates
listed here). On October 20, the CR Secretary General described
his party as "Liberal but with security and counternarcotics
teeth." Vargas told the Ambassador on October 27 that he hopes to
form a coalition with the Liberals but could never form a coalition
with Polo due to ideological differences. The former Senate
President (and top vote-getter by far in the 2006 congressional
elections) has the best defined platform thus far on a range of
topics. A survivor of various assassination attempts (he lost some
fingers to a bomb), Vargas would expand Uribe's security policies
while increasing attention to social and infrastructure issues.
REDUCING THREATS THROUGH ELECTION OBSERVATION
---------------------------------------------
9. (SBU) Eighty-seven of the 268 members of Congress were or are
under investigation in the "parapolitical scandal" from the 2006
elections (including 17 who have been acquitted). The
investigations, carried out by the Supreme Court, center on the
legislators' direct involvement in, or financial and other support
from, paramilitary organizations. Although the scandal has faded
from the headlines, it crippled the Congress and citizen confidence
(54% of Gallup poll respondents had an unfavorable image of
Congress). Avoiding a repeat in the 2010 elections is paramount,
and some reforms aimed at increasing transparency and penalties
were enacted this year. In that sense, pre-election monitoring,
especially of the legislative elections, will be even more
important than Election Day observation. International help,
including in vetting candidate lists and strengthening party
responsibility, will be crucial to clean elections. Many party
leaders have expressed to us their concerns about narcotics money
in campaigns. PC leaders told us on October 20 that they have
already disqualified candidates and are vetting all candidates with
the Comptroller, Inspector General and Prosecutor General. The PC
considers reasonable doubt of wrongdoing enough to warrant
disqualification, even in the absence of a legal case or
conviction.
10. (C) Election Day violence or technical problems have not been
major issues in most parts of Colombia in recent elections.
However, ensuring that voting in rural or post-conflict areas goes
smoothly and without criminal threats is a concern. The ability of
citizens to participate freely in elections in consolidation zones
will be an important step in building confidence in the state and
democratic institutions. The GOC has requested an OAS observation
mission, and the Embassy plans on participating in OAS and local
efforts. USAID is also working with political parties and civil
society election bodies to improve transparency (ref G).
Fortunately, there are several well-established local and
international NGOs already working on election issues, including
identification of the riskiest polling locations.
BROWNFIELD
