VZCZCXYZ0006
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUM #0043/01 0240833
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 240833Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1846
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 5955
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 3145
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2844
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0086
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 0058
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI S E C R E T ULAANBAATAR 000043 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/CM AND NEA/NGA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2018 
TAGS:          
SUBJECT: MONGOLIAN VIEWS REGARDING IRAQ DEPLOYMENTS 
 
REF: A. A) STATE 04865 
      B. B) 07 ULAANBAATAR 0681 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Mark C. Minton for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D) 
 
 1. (S) SUMMARY:  Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor (FPA) 
Tsogtbaatar told the DCM January 23 that President Enkhbayar, 
 
SIPDIS 
his boss, firmly supports Mongolia's continued presence, 
stressing Mongolia is essentially in Iraq to support the U.S. 
In general, Mongolians support such a presence, in 
Tsogtbaatar's view, but the Government of Mongolia (GOM) 
 
SIPDIS 
prefers the cover of a UNSC resolution.  Tsogtbaatar was 
unsure whether June Parliamentary elections would change this 
dynamic (ditto regarding U.S. elections), adding it was 
unlikely the Parliament would consider changing existing 
legal restrictions during an election year.  He sought 
additional background information on the Defense Cooperation 
Agreement idea, welcomed this initial dialogue, and offered 
suggestions for other consultations, END SUMMARY. 
 
 2. (S) The DCM met January 23 with Presidential Foreign 
Policy Advisor (FPA) Tsogtbaatar to discuss ref A proposal 
regarding post-2009 participation in coalition activities in 
Iraq.  Tsogtbaatar said he knew President Enkhbayar's view, 
which was to support the U.S. in Iraq, but he could not speak 
for the Prime Minister or the Speaker, the other two members 
of Mongolia's National Security Council, nor the Cabinet. He 
noted that this was an election year for both the U.S. and 
Mongolia (for Parliament and local government this year) so 
it was difficult to predict how the winners might respond as 
far out as 2009 and beyond, and Mongolia will hold 
presidential elections in 2009, though he predicted President 
Enkhbayar would win that race.  In general, he felt that both 
Mongolia's ruling Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party as 
well as the Democratic Party supported Mongolia's continued 
presence in Iraq and that support among the Mongolian public 
for a presence was generally strong.  That said, Mongolia's 
presence would also need to be considered within the context 
of the participation of other coalition partners, he added. 
 
 3. (S) Turning to the framework under which Mongolia 
participated, Tsogtbaatar underscored the importance of a UN 
Security  Council Resolution to provide the umbrella for 
Mongolia's participation.  He urged that some sort of "bare 
bones" UNSC resolution be worked out and he mused that 
Mongolia might co-sponsor such a resolution.  He thought 
participation under a U.S.-Iraq Defense Cooperation Agreement 
(DCA) would be problematic, reiterating ref B constraints on 
Mongolia's forces (can't be used for combat outside 
Mongolia's borders, limited participating under UNSC 
resolutions, etc.), but he did not/not rule out such 
participation.  He said he was not familiar with U.S. DCAs 
nor Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) and he asked for some 
background reading material on these topics. 
 
 4.  (S) Tsogtbaatar was circumspect about prospects of 
getting any kind of special legislation passed through 
Parliament to circumvent existing restrictions, noting 
Parliament and the GOM has a full plate already this election 
year.  He concluded by reiterating that it was his view that 
this current government, which will last at least through the 
June elections, would remain in Iraq through 2008 because it 
supports the U.S.  This initial exchange on post-2009 was 
useful, in his view, and he suggested making discreet 
approaches as well to the Prime Minister's Foreign Policy 
Advisor, Mr. Jambaldorj (previously the Director General of 
the Foreign Ministry's Americas, Middle East, and Africa 
bureau) and the Foreign Ministry. 
 
 5.  (S) The DATT's gleanings from his discussions with 
Ministry of Defense officials revealed a somewhat more 
tentative assessment of Mongolia's staying power in Iraq, 
suggesting that Mongolia might rethink its current 100 troop 
commitment should the Poles pull out, regardless of whether 
another coalition force might replace the Poles.  However, 
MOD does not/not play a role in the political decision-making 
process. 
 
 6.  (S) COMMENT:  Post's view is that the Mongolian 
population largely supports a presence in Iraq and 
understands, in general, that it is dangerous business, 
although this support has not been tested to date by 
casualties.  In general, most Mongolian politicians either do 
not recognize this popular support or see it as more tenuous. 
 Tsogtbaatar's boss, President Enkhbayar, has been constant 
in his support for the U.S. (as Tsogt repeatedly underscored, 
vice commitment to Iraqi freedom, stability, etc.). Clearly a 
UNSC resolution affords the GOM the greatest political cover, 
both domestically and with neighboring Russia and China. 
Post concurs with Tsogt's assessment that seeking domestic 
legislation this year to bypass existing limitations is 
problematic both practically and politically and is dependent 
on the outcome of June's Parliamentary elections.  Post will 
follow up with approaches to PM FPA Jambaldorj and MFA and 
report the results of those discussions.  Post would 
appreciate receiving releasable DCA and SOFA background 
briefing materials.  END COMMENT. 
MINTON