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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7816
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1303
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 4839
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 8391
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5953
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RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1790
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 RANGOON 000503 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MLS, DRL, AND IO 
PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2018 
TAGS:        
SUBJECT: BURMA: OPPOSITION DIVIDED ON THE WAY FORWARD 
 
RANGOON 00000503  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: P/E Chief Leslie Hayden for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d) 
 
 1.  (C) Summary: Burma's pro-democracy opposition remains 
divided on how to respond to the regime's new constitution 
and the next step on the regime's "roadmap to 
discipline-flourishing democracy": the 2010 parliamentary 
elections.  Aung San Suu Kyi's NLD party has formally 
rejected the new constitution and called for the formation of 
the 1990 Parliament, in which the NLD won the majority of 
seats.  They have not yet made a decision on whether or not 
NLD will participate in the 2010 elections.  Ethnic MPs-elect 
state they will break with the NLD if it decides to 
participate in the election, on the grounds that 
participation challenges the legitimacy of the 1990 
Parliament.  Younger members of the pro-democracy opposition, 
however, plan to form parties and run in the 2010 elections 
in an effort to effect change and promote dialogue with the 
regime in whatever way possible.  As the pro-democracy 
opposition struggles to find a way forward after the 
referendum, it is increasingly weak and fragmented.  Ordinary 
Burmese do not care about the abstract policy mandates of the 
1990 elections in which many were too young to participate, 
and find the old guard increasingly irrelevant.  Instead, 
most Burmese want practical solutions to improve education, 
healthcare, and their standard of living.  End Summary. 
 
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The NLD 
------- 
 
 2.  (C) Pol/econ chief met with NLD "Uncles" U Nyunt Wai and 
U Lwin, to find out the NLD's plans and strategy in the wake 
of the implementation of the regime's new constitution and 
planned 2010 Parliamentary elections.  The Uncles stated that 
whether or not the party participated in the elections would 
depend on the new election law, which they anticipated the 
regime would introduce in October.  The Uncles were not sure 
if the regime would disband the NLD, but were convinced that 
even if allowed to participate, the regime would manipulate 
the rules or results in such a way to assure the NLD could 
not win. 
 
 3.  (C) U Nyunt Wai stipulated that at this moment, the NLD 
could not say if it would participate in the elections 
because the party was currently "under protest" of the 
regime's "illegal constitution."  He was emphatic that the 
protest must continue because it could bring about political 
change, though he could not specify how.  U Lwin added that 
the future was uncertain, but the NLD would open a path to 
democracy.  He could not offer any specifics on future plans. 
 Both Uncles emphasized that economic conditions in Burma 
were deteriorating, and the people deserved a government that 
could help them improve their lives.  Asked about a party 
strategy to do this, the uncles did not offer one.  On June 
19, the NLD issued a statement urging the regime to convene 
the 1990 Parliament to discuss the response to Cyclone Nargis 
and the "national crisis" of the economy and the legitimacy 
of the new constitution. 
 
----------------------- 
The Lady and the Doctor 
----------------------- 
 
 4.  (C) In a separate conversation with the Charge 
d'Affaires, Aung San Suu Kyi's doctor, Douglas, said that 
ASSK was "sympathetic" to the NLD opting out of participation 
in the 2010 election, which he believed would lead to the 
regime deregistering the party in September.  Douglas cited 
"principles" as the basis for this position, explaining the 
Party should not participate in the election since that would 
recognize the legitimacy of the regime's constitutional 
referendum.  Douglas acknowledged that the Uncles wanted to 
preserve their claims to parliamentary seats, but added they 
would honor ASSK's wishes if she directed the party to 
participate in the elections.  Douglas continued that ASSK 
had a "plan B" for participation in the elections and had 
directed him to begin recruiting respected community leaders 
to run under the auspices of a separate party that would be 
 
RANGOON 00000503  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
formed for the 2010 election.  When the Charge pointed out 
that this strategy appeared to split the NLD and weaken the 
party, Douglas acknowledged the contradiction. 
 
 5.  (C) Douglas said he had learned from patients he treated 
that imprisoned 88 Generation Students leader Ko Ko Gyi, and 
people close to him in the "pro-roadmap" camp, were preparing 
to participate in the elections, but that Min Ko Naing 
disagreed.  The Charge noted that labeling those who chose to 
participate in the election as "pro-roadmap" cast aspersions. 
 She said a good case could be made that the Burmese people 
have a right to choose, and that it was important they be 
offered real choices. 
 
 6.  (C) Douglas also expressed worry that the regime's 
mass-member organization, the Union Solidarity and 
Development Association (USDA), was recruiting respected 
community leaders, which might garner them votes in the 
election, even if people did not support the USDA as a party. 
 He described his own efforts to recruit potential candidates 
and claimed to have strong support in Chin and Rakhine State 
and in Tennassarim Division.  He was now focused on Mandalay 
and Bago.  He noted that his efforts in Rangoon and Irrawaddy 
Divisions were hindered because people were more focused on 
the relief effort than politics. 
 
------------------ 
The Ethnic Leaders 
------------------ 
 
 7.  (C) Ethnic MPs-elect from Arakan, Mon, and Chin States 
were emphatic that they would not participate in the 2010 
election, as this would confer legitimacy on the regime's 
constitution and effectively nullify the Parliament elected 
in 1990, which the regime had refused to allow to convene. 
The leaders admitted that there was great dispute among the 
CRPP and NLD leadership regarding the approach the opposition 
should take to the 2010 parliamentary elections.  If the NLD 
opted to participate in the elections, the ethnic leaders 
would break with them, they asserted.  The leaders complained 
that though they met frequently with the NLD, their ideas 
were often disregarded.  Unification depended on the NLD, 
they stressed, the party needed to give more recognition to 
the needs of the ethnic nationalities.  The MPs-elect said 
the policy unanimously adopted by the CRPP was to form the 
Peoples Parliament based on the results of the 1990 
elections.  Any other option was unacceptable to them. 
 
 8.  (C) The ethnic leaders believed that despite the 
formation of a Parliament in 2010, the military would 
continue to control the country, based on its allotted 
twenty-five percent of parliamentary seats and control of key 
cabinet appointments.  Participation in the regime's 
Parliament would be "useless" they stated.  The MPs-elect 
could not offer any concrete strategies to effect change 
through non-participation, although they said they would 
organize marches and demonstrations to exploit what they 
believed would be inevitable splits between the military and 
the future Parliament. 
 
---------------------- 
The Younger Generation 
---------------------- 
 
 9.  (C) Many younger members of the pro-democracy opposition 
take a different view.  They want to form political parties 
and run for Parliament in an effort to gain some voice in the 
future government.  Toe Kyaw Hlaing, an 88 Generation leader 
who is quietly directing the movement while the other leaders 
are in prison or in hiding, told us this movement was 
suffering because the regime continued to arrest its members, 
and because of the absence of the unifying leadership of Min 
Ko Naing.  The 88 Generation was always a loose coalition of 
various groups of students with strong personalities and 
generational differences.  Min Ko Naing's gentle, 
good-humored leadership was key in keeping this coalition 
together, and his absence was felt, Toe Kyaw Hlaing lamented. 
 
 
RANGOON 00000503  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
 10.  (C) Toe Kyaw Hlaing said that many 88 Generation and NLD 
Youth want to form political parties and run for Parliament. 
As soon as the regime debuts its new election law, they will 
begin organizing and strategizing for 2010.  The younger 
members of the opposition are fed up with the constant 
bickering and inaction of the NLD Uncles and the CRPP, Toe 
Kyaw Hlaing stressed.  The new constitution was a reality and 
the pro-democracy movement must move forward to try to effect 
change any way it could, he emphasized.  Toe Kyaw Hlaing 
believed the new Parliament could actually serve as a forum 
for dialogue between the military, political parties, and the 
ethnic nationalities.  The pro-democracy supporters would 
only be included in this dialogue if they opted to 
participate in the election.  Parliamentary debates, 
discussions, and committees could be a tool to discuss 
productive political and social changes in Burma, and a 
possible way to convert younger, more progressive military 
officers to new ways of thinking. 
 Although the regime had allotted twenty-five percent of 
Parliamentary seats to the military, nothing guaranteed this 
bloc would necessarily vote together all of the time, Toe 
Kyaw Hlaing speculated. 
 
 11.  (C) The response to the cyclone had only increased 
popular dissatisfaction with the regime, and Toe Kyaw Hlaing 
was trying to build new alliances to capitalize on this 
discontent.  He cited as an example a new generation of 
young, successful businessmen who were frustrated with the 
cronies' monopolization of the economy.  He was exploring an 
alliance with them to finance campaigns for pro-democracy 
candidates.  88 Generation would try to choose candidates not 
overtly identified with the current opposition, so they would 
not attract immediate attention from the regime.  Rather than 
being vocally anti-regime, he explained, these candidates 
could run on platforms proposing improvements in education, 
healthcare, and economic improvements, which would receive 
broad popular support in an election. 
 
 12.  (C) Toe Kyaw Hlaing emphasized the importance of 
bridging the divide between the ethnic nationalities and the 
predominately ethnic Burman NLD.  88 Generation planned to 
establish offices in Burma's ethnic states to consult with 
the cease-fire groups and ethnic opposition parties.  These 
offices would be useful for forming relationships that could 
be a basis for dialogue and possible coalitions in a future 
Parliament, he stressed. 
 
-------- 
Comment: 
-------- 
 
 13.  (C) Division and infighting continue to characterize the 
leadership of the NLD and the CRPP.  They appear more 
concerned with their own positions being recognized based on 
the 1990 results, oblivious to the struggles of ordinary 
Burmese struggling trying to make ends meet in a worsening 
economy and provide decent educations and healthcare for 
their children.  Exile groups and media often paint a picture 
of the NLD as a strong, monolithic party with broad support. 
Though Aung San Suu Kyi remains a broadly-popular and 
inspiring figure, her party has suffered without her 
leadership and does benefit from the respect for her.  The 
Uncles have made little effort to broaden the NLD's support 
among the ethnic nationalities, the population as a whole, 
and even the younger generation of the pro-democracy 
movement.  Inside the country, most Burmese regard the NLD as 
weak and ineffective.  Many were too young to vote in 1990 
and do not consider the 1990 results representative any 
longer.  NLD's silence on, and even criticism of the 
September 2007 protests lost further support. 
 
 14.  (C) We need to recognize the generational shift of power 
from the geriatric 80-year-old NLD Uncles and Veteran 
Politicians to the 40 and 50-year-old 88 Generation Students 
and progressive businessmen.  This younger generation first 
stepped forward last fall and again recently to provide 
relief after Cyclone Nargis.  This is the generation who can 
make democratic change happen.  We need to find ways to 
 
RANGOON 00000503  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
bolster their efforts.  End comment. 
VILLAROSA