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CONFIDENTIAL (97070)
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UNCLASSIFIED (75792)
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Reference ID 08ABUDHABI119 (original text)
SubjectNATO SECGEN WELL RECEIVED IN ABU DHABI
OriginEmbassy Abu Dhabi
ClassificationCONFIDENTIAL
ReleasedAug 30, 2011 01:44
CreatedJan 29, 2008 14:35
VZCZCXRO4011
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHAD #0119/01 0291435
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 291435Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0332
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0070
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 000119 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2018 
TAGS:          
SUBJECT: NATO SECGEN WELL RECEIVED IN ABU DHABI 
 
 
Classified by Charge d'Affaires Martin Quinn, reasons 1.4 (B) 
and (D). 
 
 1.  (SBU) Summary:  In a brief visit to Abu Dhabi January 24, 
NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer gave a lecture 
on the goals of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), 
met senior UAEG officials to discuss potential areas or 
cooperation, and gave an upbeat briefing to NATO Ambassadors 
prior to his departure.  This first official visit of a NATO 
SecGen was well received in the UAE.  End summary. 
 
 2.  (SBU) In a January 24 lecture at the Emirates Center for 
Strategic Studies and Research, the NATO SecGen gave an 
enthusiastic overview of ICI goals and his sense of UAEG 
interest in closer cooperation with NATO.  He characterized 
four GCC countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE) as 
currently engaged in ICI, which was initiated in 2004, with 
two (Saudi Arabia and Oman) hopefully showing interest in the 
future.  (He was most optimistic about Saudi Arabia signing 
up.)  The audience of about 200, including a large uniformed 
contingent from the UAE military, seemed receptive to the 
SecGen's message that the globalization of threats (he cited 
nuclear threats and Iran) required new and novel approaches 
to security cooperation. 
 
 3.  (SBU) Stating that the NATO Defense College in Rome had a 
dedicated faculty to assist ICI participants, the SecGen 
cited training of Afghan and Iraqi security forces, disaster 
relief, peacekeeping, and military education in general as 
sources of expertise that NATO could share with GCC states, 
which send a "growing number of participants to conferences 
and seminars."  He hoped ICI partners would appoint liaison 
officers (not necessarily resident at NATO) to solidify 
coordination -- and said the conclusion of Information 
Sharing Agreements was urgently needed to regularize data 
sharing.  The benefits of closer cooperation are mutual, he 
concluded, citing his desire for a tailored package of 
engagement activities with each ICI country. 
 
 4.  (SBU) Subsequent to his lecture, the SecGen had 
high-profile meetings with UAE Minister of Defense (also Vice 
President, Prime Minister, and Ruler of Dubai) Mohammed bin 
Rashid, and Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme 
Commander of the UAE Armed Forces Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ). 
Both meetings got prominent play in local media, with the 
semi-official Arabic daily al-Ittihad putting a very positive 
spin on the visit (albeit with few substantive details as to 
potential areas of cooperation). 
 
 5.  (C) The SecGen made a reference in his lecture to the UAE 
military presence in Afghanistan, and in a private session 
with NATO Ambassadors he noted that they were "teamed up with 
Canada in Kandahar," but did not specify the nature of their 
combat mission or the size of their deployment.  Press 
coverage limited those references to "humanitarian" 
operations.  De Hoop Scheffer told NATO Ambassadors that MbZ 
had "not ruled out doing more" in Afghanistan, in addition to 
lamenting that there were not more Muslim participants in 
ISAF combating al-Qaeda, which had "hi-jacked" Islam.  He 
said MbZ feels "a bit lonely" as a moderate Arab actively 
engaged in Afghanistan -- and thus somewhat "shy" to promote 
the UAE role there.  MbZ had not committed to visit NATO 
headquarters, although the SecGen had told him that his voice 
should be heard within the alliance and that the UAE should 
be "recognized more formally as an ISAF participant."  MbZ 
had also been "extremely worried" about Iran, which had 
"dominated" the conversation. 
 
 6.  (C) De Hoop Schaffer also noted to gathered Ambassadors 
just prior to his departure (in an airport VIP lounge) that 
his Emirati interlocutors had shown "keen interest in 
strengthening cooperation with NATO" in a 26 1 format (and 
through a formalized Individual Cooperation Program, or ICP). 
 NATO is increasingly an "accepted phenomenon" in GCC 
discourse, he stated, and he left with the "strong impression 
that I was very welcome."  That said, he called for increased 
efforts to expand awareness of NATO in the Arab world.  Asked 
by ADCM to highlight NATO's particular "value added" in a 
very busy engagement calendar with the UAE (many NATO 
countries, including the U.S., having extensive and well 
developed engagement programs that often tax the limited 
personnel resources of this Gulf nation), de Hoop Schaffer 
cited the following as key priorities:  interoperability, 
peacekeeping, counter-insurgency (as practiced in 
Afghanistan), the civil-military interface, and consequence 
management / disaster response. 
 
 7.  (C) Comment:  The SecGen's first ever official visit to 
the UAE was timely and well received.  Measures of how 
 
ABU DHABI 00000119  002 OF 002 
 
 
effectively ICI engagement develops into a more concrete 
relationship will include just how specifically a menu of 
engagement activities can be tailored to address gaps not 
already covered by bilateral programs, how quickly the UAE 
concludes an Information Sharing Agreement, public 
acknowledgment by the UAE of its ISAF role in Afghanistan, 
and UAE enthusiasm for setting up formal liaison channels. 
End comment. 
QUINN
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