VZCZCXYZ0018
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0194 0851339
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O 261339Z MAR 07
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6266 S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000194 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2022 
TAGS:        
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: HEINONEN'S VIEWS ON IRAN'S DECISION TO 
CURTAIL COOPERATION 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 (h) 
 
 1.  (S) Summary:  IAEA DDG for Safeguards Heinonen on March 
26 said that the IAEA had received no notifications (orally 
or written) from Iran concerning media reports that Iran was 
canceling advance design notification under the Subsidiary 
Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement. Such a step, he 
felt, would be significant.  The IAEA legal office has not 
assessed whether this would constitute a safeguards 
violation, but our Australian counterparts think it would 
not.  End Summary. 
 
 2.  (S) IAEA Deputy Director General Heinonen acknowledged 
reading in the press about the March 25 statements by Iranian 
officials that Iran would no longer abide by "code 1-3" which 
required early notification of design information of nuclear 
facilities.  Heinonen said he was confident this was a 
garble, and that Iran meant to say "Code 3.1," which was the 
proper reference in the Iranian Subsidiary Arrangement on 
early notification of design information.  Heinonen said that 
IAEA had received nothing in writing or verbally from the 
Iranians on this issue; all he had were press reports. 
 
 3.  (S) Asked how important Code 3.1 was, Heinonen said it 
was very important.  He explained that after the Iraq nuclear 
experience in the early 1990's, the IAEA Board of Governors 
decided in 1992 that in the future, states under safeguards 
must commit to provide advance notification of design 
information.  He recalled that in 2003, Heinonen and his 
inspectors inspected Iran after the 2002 NCRI revelations. 
Because of lack of advance design information about Natanz, 
inter alia, Iran finally agreed to a formal modification of 
its Subsidiary Arrangement in early 2003 to include the 1992 
Board provision requiring advance notification. 
 
 4.  (S) Heinonen suggested that because Code 3.1 was governed 
by a special Board decision from 1992, it was a firm 
safeguards obligation for Iran equal to other obligations in 
the safeguards agreement itself.  He said that abrogation of 
advance design notification would be a significant safeguards 
violation.  Based on the press reports, he said that the 
Iranian "decision" may only affect future facilities, but 
would have no effect on Natanz.  Heinonen said it would be 
harder, without the provision, to have confidence in the 
"bigger picture" in Iran. 
 
-------------------- 
Legalities Uncertain 
-------------------- 
 
 5. (S) Our Australian counterparts, however, opined that they 
do not think Iran's latest actions constitute safeguards 
violations. Our best contact in the IAEA legal section is out 
of the country, but another told us the Subsidiary 
Arrangement is a "living document," and both sides have to 
agree to the text and on changes to the text (Note: this was 
a generic discussion on SAs, not specific to Iran.  End 
Note.) 
 
 6. (U) The Safeguards Agreement is the undertaking to allow 
safeguards to be applied; the Subsidiary Arrangement is the 
document that specifies how safeguards will be conducted. 
According to INFCIRC/153 para 39: "The Agreement should 
provide that the Agency and the State shall make Subsidiary 
Arrangements which shall specify in detail to the extent 
necessary to permit the Agency to fulfill its 
responsibilities under the safeguards agreement in an 
effective and efficient manner, how the procedures in the 
safeguards agreement are to be applied."  The Agency may 
implement safeguards while the Subsidiary Arrangement is 
under negotiation.  Once a text has been agreed, lacking 
notification from the State of a desired change, the IAEA 
would continue to believe that existing text of the 
Subsidiary Arrangements applied. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
Implications Of An Iranian Decision to Abrogate 3.1 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
 7.  (S) The April 1992 Board resolution and the August 2003 
DG's report cite the importance of providing early design 
information for new nuclear facilities, as well as to 
modifications of existing facilities. If Iran is curtailing 
implementation of Code 3.1, it conceivably could establish 
new enrichment facilities without having to provide early 
notification to the IAEA.  Since it also pertains to 
modifications of existing facilities, Iran could possibly 
change its plans at Natanz to eventually include P-2 
centrifuges without providing early notification. 
SCHULTE