VZCZCXRO5016
RR RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSA #0920/01 0731231
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 141231Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8715
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 2027
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 1019
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1136
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 6346
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1020
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRETORIA 000920 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2017 
TAGS:      
SUBJECT: SOUTH AFRICA WELCOMES U.S. REENGAGEMENT WITH SADC 
 
REF: A. STATE 10483 
      B. 06 STATE 191811 
      C. 06 GABORONE 1631 
 
Classified By: Chief of Mission Eric M. Bost.  Reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
 1.  (C) SUMMARY:  South African officials welcomed U.S. 
reengagement in SADC and urged support for Executive 
Secretary Salomao's five priority areas:  economic 
 
SIPDIS 
integration, infrastructure development, disaster management, 
cross-cutting social sectors, and peace and security.  They 
cautioned against overreliance on the SADC Secretariat, 
arguing that many key regional projects can be pursued with 
national governments.  Think tank analysts in South Africa 
are generally skeptical about the SAG commitment to SADC and 
the organization's long-term economic value.  The Department 
may wish to consider sending an official from the Department 
and/or Special Representative to SADC Canavan to Pretoria to 
deepen the discussions on the U.S. SADC reengagement 
strategy.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 2. (C) PolCounselor delivered Ref A message on U.S. 
reengagement in the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) March 6 to Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) Chief 
Director: Africa Multilateral Themba Rubushe (DAS-level) and 
Acting Director for SADC Howie Short.  Rubushe and Short 
welcomed the U.S. interest in SADC and believed there were a 
number of areas where U.S. engagement could be helpful.  They 
urged close cooperation with the SADC Secretariat on 
prioritizing U.S. involvement. 
 
------------------------ 
SADC Priorities As Guide 
------------------------ 
 
 3. (C) Short suggested that the five SADC critical priority 
areas, as outlined by SADC Executive Secretary Salomao and 
endorsed by the Heads of State at the 2006 Maseru Summit, 
should guide U.S. engagement with SADC: 
 
-- economic integration, including, Short stressed, 
development and diversification of national economies; 
 
-- infrastructure development, in areas like transport, 
electricity, communications, water, and tourism; 
 
-- management of "disasters," including HIV/AIDS, food 
security, and natural disasters; 
 
-- other cross-cutting sectors that "add value" to the top 
three priorities, such as education, health, environment, 
gender, and youth; and 
 
-- peace and security (Short noted that this was not one of 
Salomao's priority areas, but rather was added by HOSs at the 
August 2006 Maseru Summit). 
 
 4. (C) Short cautioned against "overreliance" on the SADC 
Secretariat.  Much of the SADC agenda, as described above, 
 
SIPDIS 
relies on individual member states, or partnerships between 
states, not on the regional organization itself. 
International partners need not always look to SADC to 
support regional goals; there is "lots of juicy stuff to do" 
through support for development projects in individual 
countries. 
 
 5. (C) Rubushe and Short also urged the United States to 
express support for Executive Secretary Salomao and his 
vision for the region, telling him, "We see what you are 
trying to do and we support it."  Short said that Salomao is 
often frustrated by the lack of action among SADC member 
states. 
 
------------------ 
Zimbabwe a "Given" 
------------------ 
 
 6. (C) As SADC deepens its integration, the region must work 
with Zimbabwe, Short said.  It is a "pivot" country, as the 
major transport routes to the north pass through the country. 
 Zimbabwe is not a "variable" in regional dynamics, it is a 
"given." 
 
------------------ 
 
PRETORIA 00000920  002 OF 002 
 
 
COMESA Versus SADC 
------------------ 
 
 7. (C) PolCounselor asked about how the SAG views other 
regional organizations, such as the Common Market for East 
and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Southern Africa Customs 
Union (SACU).  Rubushe observed that over time, two of the 
three organizations will likely die since you cannot have 
overlapping customs unions.  When time comes, perhaps as soon 
as 2010 (the goal for instituting a SADC Customs Union), 
countries will have to make a decision whether COMESA or SADC 
better serves their interests.  COMESA is blessed with a 
strong Executive Secretary and a much larger economic market 
than SADC, but has not addressed the peace and security 
issues like SADC and does not have the same political weight. 
 The economic integration in SACU is "shallow," Rubushe said, 
but works because of the practical benefit of funds being 
returned to member states. 
 
--------------------------- 
Regional Peace and Security 
--------------------------- 
 
 8. (C) PolCounselor also expressed U.S. interest in 
supporting regional peace and security initiatives, but noted 
that U.S. policy and legislative restrictions on Zimbabwe 
limit the U.S. ability to engage in this area.  Rubushe and 
Short expressed an openness to discuss peace and security 
cooperation in more detail with U.S. officials, although they 
noted that the South African Department of Defense is the 
lead agency on these issues.  Short reiterated President 
Mbeki's comment that southern Africa does not face any 
immediate security crises, and thus can "take its time" in 
developing an effective regional peacekeeping brigade and 
other peace structures.  He said that SADC has already done 
much valuable work in areas like doctrine, logistics, 
planning, and compatibility, which is not always appreciated 
by international partners. 
 
---------------------- 
Think Tank Perspective 
---------------------- 
 
 9. (C) Prominent think tank analysts in South Africa have 
expressed skepticism about the long-term prospects for SADC 
as an engine of regional integration and growth.  Jakkie 
Cilliers, Executive Director of the Institute for Security 
Studies (ISS), questioned whether South Africa is serious 
about regional integration.  The SAG expresses rhetorical 
support for SADC, but has been unwilling to cede any 
sovereignty to SADC.  Cilliers noted that the southern 
African region has been the slowest to develop a strong 
regional organization, perhaps because southern African 
countries were last to gain their independence and thus are 
reticent to cede sovereignty. 
 
 10. (C) Moeletsi Mbeki, prominent businessman, brother of 
President Mbeki, and Deputy Chairperson of the South African 
Institute for International Affairs (SAIIA), suggested that 
the future of economic integration lies with COMESA, not 
SADC.  SADC integration does not offer any significant 
economic benefits to South African businesses, unlike COMESA 
which reaches through the major markets of Kenya, Ethiopia 
and Egypt.  Mbeki noted that SADC was created in reaction to 
the destabilization threat from apartheid.  Since South 
Africa's democratic transition in 1994, the organization may 
be irrelevant and anachronistic. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
 11. (C) Support for SADC's development and regional 
integration remains one of South Africa's foreign policy 
priorities.  The SAG officials appreciated our approach to 
them on SADC issues, and we encourage continued dialogue. 
The Department may wish to consider sending an official from 
the Department and/or Special Representative to SADC Canavan, 
to Pretoria to deepen the discussions on the U.S. SADC 
reengagement strategy. 
BOST