VZCZCXRO6646
RR RUEHDE RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHSA #4227/01 3541240
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 201240Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3002
INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1246
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 2149
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 6523
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA 0350
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRETORIA 004227 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/E, AF/S 
ANTANANARIVO FOR G. SIBLEY, S. RODRIQUEZ 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2017 
TAGS:              
SUBJECT: DFA OFFICIAL CALLS FOR DIALOGUE IN COMOROS, 
ETHIOPIAN TROOPS OUT OF SOMALIA 
 
REF: A. ANTANANARIVO 1227 AND PREVIOUS 
 
      B. PRETORIA 0103 
 
Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Catherine Kay.  Reasons 1.4(b 
) and (d). 
 
 1. (C) SUMMARY.  The AU sanctions against the Comoran island 
of Anjouan are beginning to create a "certain amount of 
nervousness" on Anjouan and thus some momentum for 
negotiations, according to DFA Director Maitland.  The AU 
Commission is planning a roundtable discussion on Comoros o/a 
January 21 in Addis Ababa on the margins of the Council of 
Ministers meeting, which the SAG hopes will "reenergize" the 
diplomatic track.  The SAG strongly opposes military action 
against Anjouan.  On Somalia, Maitland believes that Ethiopia 
should withdraw immediately, that other regional powers 
should stop interfering, and that the Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) should be expanded to include the broad 
range of political actors, including the "Asmara group."  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
 2. (U) PolOff met December 19 with Graham Maitland, 
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) Director for the Horn of 
Africa and Indian Island Nations; Phindile Xaba, Deputy 
Director responsible for the Horn; and Wolf Rothkegel, Deputy 
Director responsible for Comoros. 
 
------------------------ 
Comoros -- Need Dialogue 
------------------------ 
 
 3. (C) According to DFA Director Maitland, the AU sanctions 
against the Comoran island of Anjouan are beginning to have 
some impact, creating a "certain amount of nervousness in 
Anjouan."  He attributes recent moves toward talks -- 
including the Grand Comoran President's peace initiative and 
private signals from Colonel Bacar's camp that he is ready to 
negotiate (NFI) -- to the new dynamic created by the AU 
sanctions.  Rothkegel added that the central government in 
Moroni also is becoming aware (1) that sanctions will not, by 
themselves, lead to Bacar's departure, and (2) that outside 
military action is unlikely, both of which may lead them back 
to the negotiating table. 
 
 4. (C) The AU Commission plans to host a roundtable 
discussion on Comoros on the margins of the next AU Council 
of Ministers meeting, currently scheduled to take place in 
Addis Ababa o/a January 21.  Maitland and Rothkegel view the 
AU event as an opportunity to "reenergize the diplomatic 
channel."  They hope Colonel Bacar and President Sambi will 
attend, but noted that the AU, not South Africa, will issue 
invitations.  Speaking frankly, Maitland said that the 
central government is too "obsessed" with holding a new 
election in Anjouan, which will not solve the political 
problems in the Comoros.  The fundamental problems relate to 
a clash of visions about the future of the country, the 
degree of centralization, and the future of the union 
institutions -- and neither Bacar, Sambi, nor any other 
Comoran leader is demonstrating leadership to deal with those 
complex issues. 
 
 5. (C) According to Maitland, South Africa strongly opposes 
military action against Bacar and will not support an AU 
mandate or involvement in such operation.  The SAG believes 
the only lasting solution to the crisis in Comoros is 
political and will emerge from dialogue, not military force. 
Qpolitical and will emerge from dialogue, not military force. 
Maitland also noted that a military intervention would be 
logistically complicated and "not as easy as one might think." 
 
-------------------------------- 
Somalia -- Ethiopia Must Get Out 
-------------------------------- 
 
 6. (C) Turning to Somalia, Maitland and Xaba repeated the 
theme (see ref B) that the Ethiopian involvement in Somalia 
was a "huge mistake" and their troops should leave as soon as 
possible.  (NOTE: Publicly, South Africa supports the AU 
mission in Somalia.  We suspect that more senior DFA 
 
PRETORIA 00004227  002 OF 002 
 
 
officials privately share Maitland's reservations about the 
Ethiopian involvement in Somalia.  END SUMMARY.)  The 
Ethiopians have done little to create security or to help the 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG), and have instead 
opened to the door to an "Islamist comeback."  Maitland 
dismissed the argument that a precipitous Ethiopian 
withdrawal would create a security vacuum, suggesting instead 
that the AU forces are "not doing much anyway" and "security 
is already bad." 
 
 7. (C) According to Maitland, there are two keys to stability 
in Somalia.  First, regional governments, including Ethiopia, 
but also Eritrea and others, must cease their interference in 
Somalia.  There must be a Somali solution to the Somali 
political crisis.  Second, the TFG must broaden its 
government to include a wide range of political actors, 
including the "Asmara group." 
 
 8. (C) Maitland confirmed that South Africa is not planning 
any new initiatives on Somalia.  The SAG continues to pay its 
contribution to the AU for AMISOM and would consider requests 
for assistance with reconciliation.  The SAG also partially 
funded a "track two" meeting that took place in November in 
South Africa, hosted by the South African non-governmental 
organization ACCORD.  Both members of the TFG and "Asmara 
group" attended the meeting, but Maitland did not offer to 
share any details from this initiative.  (COMMENT: Post will 
reach out to ACCORD following the South African summer 
holidays to seek additional information on the meeting.  END 
COMMENT.) 
BOST