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CONFIDENTIAL (97070)
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN (4678)
SECRET (11322)
SECRET//NOFORN (4330)
UNCLASSIFIED (75792)
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (58095)
Reference ID 07BRATISLAVA616 (original text)
SubjectSLOVAKIA: DEFENSE MINISTER KASICKY -- OUT OF STEP
OriginEmbassy Bratislava
ClassificationCONFIDENTIAL
ReleasedAug 30, 2011 01:44
CreatedNov 16, 2007 08:43
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSL #0616/01 3200843
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 160843Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA
TO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1326
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHSL/USDAO BRATISLAVA LO IMMEDIATE C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000616 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/NCE, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/11/2017 
TAGS:          
SUBJECT: SLOVAKIA: DEFENSE MINISTER KASICKY -- OUT OF STEP 
ON MISSILE DEFENSE 
 
REF: BRATISLAVA 612 BRATISLAVA 578 BRATISLAVA 487 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Rodolphe M. Vallee for reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
 1. (U) This is an Action Cable.  See para 7. 
 
 2. (C) Summary. During a breakfast meeting with the 
Ambassador on November 9, Minister of Defense Frantisek 
Kasicky reviewed the state-of-play on preparations for new 
Slovak contributions to ISAF and elaborated the Slovak 
position on Missile Defense. (Due to the Minister's late 
arrival, the Ambassador did not have an opportunity to raise 
other topics.) Kasicky confirmed that preparations for 
additional Slovak deployments in 2008 would proceed in line 
with GOS discussions with the Dutch.  Furthermore, Slovakia 
would move forward according to its stated plans regardless 
of the outcome of the Dutch parliamentary debate.  On Missile 
Defense, however, Kasicky repeated arguments that U.S. 
negotiations with Czech Republic and Poland had had a 
negative effect on the Alliance and had needlessly provoked 
the Russians.  The Slovak position, i.e., that the only 
appropriate venues for discussion of Missile Defense in 
Europe were in NATO and the EU, had been proven right.  In 
response to the Ambassador's offer to arrange a briefing for 
the GOS on Iranian capabilities, Kasicky said "we don't doubt 
the Iranian threat," but the important thing is what kind of 
document (on MD) will be prepared for NATO Ministers.  He 
further suggested that another factor shaping the outcome on 
MD in Bucharest could be U.S. willingness to "drop certain 
positions."  Kasicky twice stated that the Slovak position on 
Missile Defense should not be viewed as an "attack on either 
side," but rather as the "correct" stance from a country that 
can "take its own positions."  Per Ref A, FM Kubis assured 
Ambassador on November 13 that Kasicky's comments are not 
official GOS policy. End Summary. 
 
Afghanistan 
----------- 
 
 3. (C)  Ambassador Vallee expressed appreciation for the 
government's decision to bolster its contribution to ISAF in 
2008, noting the positive impact this contribution would have 
on the upcoming Dutch parliamentary debate.  Kasicky stated 
that Slovak MOD representatives had met with counterparts in 
The Hague on November 8 to review the details of the Slovak 
deployment.  Kasicky confirmed that surgical teams slated to 
work in the Czech Field hospital in Kabul would be deployed 
in March or April.  The base security unit should deploy in 
June, per the Dutch request.  Reinforcements for PRTs will be 
sent within a year.  MOD Kasicky stated clearly that Slovak 
deployments would not hinge on the outcome of the Dutch 
parliamentary vote on ISAF.  In addition to the planned 
increase in Afghanistan, Kasicky confirmed that Slovakia 
would send two helicopters, with associated support 
personnel, to Kosovo in December.  He predicted that both 
increases would be approved by the Slovak parliament in its 
upcoming session. As for post-2008 deployments, the 
government had no plans to advance any proposals in the near 
term.  (Comment: In a recent conversation with DATT, 
Kasicky's top advisor indicated that the MOD was considering 
additional contributions in 2009 and 2010 in which the MOD 
would recommend an increase of 50 personnel each year. End 
Comment.) 
 
Missile Defense 
--------------- 
 
 4. (C)  Ambassador Vallee noted the apparent disconnect 
between DefMin Kasicky's Missile Defense intervention at the 
Noordwijk Ministerial -- in which he claimed that bilateral 
negotiations had undermined Alliance solidarity -- and the 
current state of play on Missile Defense discussions within 
NATO and with the Russian Federation.  Ambassador Vallee 
added that almost all Allies had expressed appreciation for 
the level and frequency of U.S. consultations on the issue. 
Kasicky said that it has always been the Slovak position that 
any discussion about Missile Defense in Europe must take 
place in NATO and the EU because it affects all European 
countries.  This stance had been proven "correct" and the 
result, Kasicky said, is "exactly what we wanted."  The NATO 
report on MD due in February should be pragmatic and address 
all legal, political, technical and financial aspects of 
Missile Defense, according to Kasicky.  Although he didn't 
offer any insights into GOS thinking on what such a document 
should look like, he did suggest that U.S. willingness to 
"drop certain positions" could play a role in the NATO 
 
decision-making process.  When pressed by the Ambassador as 
to whether Slovakia supported the notion that U.S. 
negotiations with Poland or the Czech Republic should be 
subject to NATO approval, Kasicky demurred, saying that was a 
"hypothetical" question. 
 
Independent...or Unwilling to Provoke the Bear? 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
 5. (C) Recalling the "clear signals" President Putin sent 
regarding missile defense at the February Wehrkunde 
conference, Kasicky suggested that the U.S. had needlessly 
provoked Russia by its insistence on bilateral negotiations 
with the Czech Republic and Poland.  Kasicky characterized 
the Russian threat to redirect its nuclear capabilities 
toward Europe as an "exaggerated reaction," but implicitly 
laid the blame for tensions (with Russia, within the Czech 
Republic) on the U.S.  Kasicky stated that the bilateral 
approach had not taken into account the security or views of 
others in the region, nor sensitivities about the deployment 
of foreign troops in Central Europe.  Ambassador responded 
that any troop presence in this case would be the result of 
an invitation by sovereign governments and not imposed by 
outsiders as with the Soviets. Echoing comments made by PM 
Fico in a November 5 interview about Slovakia's "independence 
and openness," Kasicky stated at the close of the meeting 
that "Slovakia is a country that can take its own positions 
and be articulate about them." These opinions aren't aimed 
against any party, Kasicky added. 
 
 6. (C) Ref A reports FM Kubis's firm stance that Kasicky's 
remarks to the NAC-D are not official GOS policy regarding 
possible Czech and Polish deployments.  That policy, Kubis 
stressed, remained an issue for the governments of those 
countries.  We recounted Kasicky's remarks to President 
Gasparovic's foreign affairs advisor, Jan Foltin, on November 
 15.  Foltin, who will accompany Gasparovic to Bucharest, told 
us that Gasparovic was willing to take a responsible position 
at the NATO Summit in Riga despite Fico's views, and Foltin 
was sure Gasparovic would be willing to play the same role at 
Bucharest. 
 
 7. (C) Comment and Action Request: Under the guise of 
"independence," Kasicky, like Fico, displays an overweening 
concern for Russian sensitivities regarding Missile Defense. 
In Kasicky's rendering, it is due mainly to Russian (and 
Slovak) intervention that the issue finally is being 
discussed in the proper venues.  He offered no views -- 
positive or negative -- about U.S. initiatives to address a 
range of Allied and Russian concerns. In fact, he did not 
address the core issue, i.e., the nature of the threat and 
the steps needed to address it, except to note that linking 
existing and potential systems would be "complex." Perhaps 
more troubling, however, was Kasicky's tendency to gloss over 
the issue of the Iranian threat in favor of complaints about 
the U.S. approach.  Taken together with PM Fico's continued 
public comments opposing Missile Defense, Post believes that 
a high-level classified briefing on Iran and MD from Missile 
Defense Agency officials is needed to shine the spotlight 
where it belongs: on the threat. Such a briefing would help 
bolster the position of those, such as FM Kubis and NATO 
PermRep Slobodnik, who maintain that U.S. negotiations with 
the Czechs and Poles are bilateral issues and who have begun 
to speak in favorable terms about the possibility of linking 
complementary NATO and U.S. systems.  First-hand exposure to 
convincing threat information and briefings on U.S. proposals 
would also make it harder for Fico and Kasicky to oppose the 
key MD goals Secretary Gates articulated in Noordwijk. Post 
requests assistance from Washington agencies in securing an 
MDA visit before the end of the year.  End Comment and Action 
Request. 
 
 
VALLEE
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