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Reference ID 06SANSALVADOR198 (original text)
SubjectEL SALVADOR FRAUD SUMMARY 1ST QUARTER FY06
OriginEmbassy San Salvador
ClassificationUNCLASSIFIED
ReleasedAug 30, 2011 01:44
CreatedJan 26, 2006 12:47
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 SAN SALVADOR 000198 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP; DEPT ALSO PASS TO KCC; POSTS FOR FRAUD 
PREVENTION MANAGERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS:            
SUBJECT: EL SALVADOR FRAUD SUMMARY 1ST QUARTER FY06 
 
REF: 05 STATE 205073 
 
In response to reftel, Post is updating its fraud 
summary information for the first quarter of FY06. 
 
------------------- 
Country Conditions 
------------------- 
 
 1.  Political Structure:  El Salvador is a constitutional 
democracy with three branches of national government; a 
unicameral legislature, a judiciary, and an executive branch 
headed by a president.  El Salvador has a multi-party 
political system, although in reality two parties, the right 
leaning National Republican Alliance (ARENA) and the left 
leaning Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), 
garnered more than 92 percent of the votes in the 2004 
Presidential Election.  The country is divided into fourteen 
administrative departments, and further divided into 262 
municipalities that are led by elected mayors. 
 
 2.  Economy:  El Salvador has a market-based economy and 
uses the U.S. dollar as its official currency. 
Historically, agricultural exports (including coffee, sugar, 
and shrimp) accounted for a majority of the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) but during the 1990s the service sector and 
light manufacturing became the leading contributors. The 
agricultural sector continues to be an important employer of 
the country's approximately 6.8 million citizens, but over 
half the population is employed in services, led by retail 
services.  The average monthly income is 250 USD. 
Remittances from Salvadoran expatriates in the United States 
and elsewhere are the largest single source of foreign 
income, equaling 16.6 percent of 2005 GDP. In 2005 El 
Salvador received 2.8 billion dollars in remittances. 
 
 3.  Gangs:  Violent crime, especially homicide, is at a 
critical level in El Salvador.  Many urban areas, including 
sections of the capital, provide an environment in which 
gang members, such as the MS-13 and 18th Street, may 
transit, live and operate with relative freedom from 
prosecution. These gangs engage in alien smuggling and drug 
trafficking to the United States.  The Salvadoran government 
through the National Civil Police (PNC) is attempting to 
combat the gang problem with a specialized task force and 
targeted programs.  Enhanced cooperation with other 
countries, especially the United States, has the potential 
to stem the increase of gang-related violence. 
 
 4.  Illegal Immigration:  El Salvador is a source of chronic 
illegal immigration into the United States.  Conservative 
estimates put the number of people leaving El Salvador at 
approximately 300 per day.  Alien smugglers, also known as 
"coyotes," make a lucrative income from these illegal 
immigrants by charging thousands of dollars per person. 
Many Salvadorans admire the coyotes for their on- the-ground 
success in assisting Salvadorans to reach the United States 
and send back money on which many families, and indirectly 
the country, depend. 
 
 5. Document Unreliability:  Salvadoran civil documents have 
an extremely low level of credibility.  Each of the 262 
municipalities independently issue birth, death, and 
marriage certificates.  Each municipality established its 
own format for these documents and periodically updates the 
format with no set schedule.  Most municipalities require 
little or no proof of the information they formally 
document, and fraud perpetrated by both individual citizens 
and municipal civil registry officials is commonplace. 
Consequently, consular officers encounter numerous civil 
documents with no standardized format or security features 
and minimal credibility.  A Salvadoran law mandates the 
National Civil Registry (RNPN), to assume responsibility for 
centralizing and standardizing the issuance and archiving of 
all civil documents, but the municipalities are resisting 
compliance, claiming the law infringes municipal authority. 
 
 6.  National Identity Document:  The most secure civil 
document in El Salvador is the National Identification Card 
(DUI) issued by the RNPN.  The DUI is available to all 
Salvadorans over the age of eighteen and is required for 
bank transactions, many business transactions, voting, and 
for issuance of a Salvadoran passport.  The DUI's 
sophisticated security features, including biometric 
fingerprinting, gives the document a high degree of 
credibility.  According to the RNPN, more than 90 percent of 
the adult population is documented with a DUI. 
 
 7.  Air Traffic to the U.S.:  El Salvador's international 
airport hosts over ten direct flights per day to U.S. 
destinations, including Houston, Washington, D.C., Los 
Angeles, Boston, New York, Atlanta, Miami, and Dallas-Fort 
Worth.  With so many direct flights to the United States, El 
Salvador is experiencing an increase in the use of its 
international airport as a transit point by alien smugglers. 
Those being smuggled by air most often originate from Asia, 
notably China, but Ecuadorians, Brazilians, Cubans and other 
nationalities have attempted to transit El Salvador for the 
U.S. using false or fraudulently obtained travel documents. 
 8.  Background Conclusion:  El Salvador offers a large 
portion of its population poor living conditions. Fraudulent 
civil documents are commonplace and easily obtained.  The 
large size and relative affluence of the Salvadoran 
community in the United States encourages other Salvadorans 
to seek a better life for themselves and their families by 
immigrating to the United States, legally or otherwise.  El 
Salvador's geographic proximity to the U.S. and regular air 
connections make it an attractive transit point for alien 
smugglers.  In combination, these factors  create an 
environment of chronic fraud and established El Salvador as 
a strategically important location for alien smugglers. 
 
---------- 
NIV Fraud 
---------- 
 
 9.  Ninety-four percent of visa applications at Post are for 
B1/B2's, and most NIV fraud is detected in this category. 
Fraudulent and fraudulently-obtained documents such as birth 
and death certificates, immigration stamps, tax documents, 
job letters, and even passports are presented regularly to 
support NIV applications. Document vendors often offer a 
"package" of false documents and coach applicants for their 
visa interview. 
 
 10.  The most common NIV document fraud involves the 
purchase of false Salvadoran immigration stamps to hide the 
applicant's overstay in the United States.  Applicants most 
often present their own passports with false stamps for visa 
renewal.  Also common is the presentation of the 
fraudulently stamped passport of a family member of the 
applicant.  While the stamp indicates the family member has 
returned to El Salvador, in fact, he or she remains in the 
United States.  Consular officers are trained to recognize 
false stamps and refer these cases to FPU for confirmation 
with Salvadoran Immigration officials before final 
adjudication. 
 
 11.  Also common is the presentation of false Salvadoran 
birth certificates submitted in efforts to smuggle minors 
into the United States.  In most cases the minor's 
grandparents or other relatives pose as the parents for the 
visa interview, because the actual parents are in the U.S. 
illegally.  The minors and the putative parents apply for 
visas with authentic, but fraudulently-obtained, birth 
certificates. Late birth registrations of one year or more 
is a common indicator of this type of fraud. 
 
 12.  Applicants often submit fraudulent tax documents, job 
letters, and bank statements in an effort to overcome 214b. 
These documents are among the easiest to detect, but are 
nonetheless popular with applicants who often purchase them 
from document vendors. 
 
 13.  The number of H2B visa applications rose in the past 
year by 66 percent, although Post's H2B volume still trails 
the two regional leaders, Mexico and Guatemala.  The 
increase in H2B applications accompanied an increase in H2B- 
related fraud.  A recent case involved a local recruiter 
advertising the opportunity to work in the United States. 
Interested applicants were charged a 10 USD consultancy fee 
to be evaluated for acceptance into the program.  If 
accepted into the work program the applicant must pay an 
additional 500 USD to the recruiter.  The applicant's name 
is then included in a valid petition sponsored by the U.S. 
company that the recruiter represents.   If the applicant is 
granted a work visa under this petition they are required to 
pay upwards of 4,000 USD from their US salaries to the 
recruiter.  In preparation for their visa interviews, the 
applicants are coached by the recruiters to answer all 
questions according to a practiced script and to deny that 
any additional fees were required to be included in the 
petition.  When consular officers detect this type of fraud 
they refuse the applicants under 214b.  Post is conducting 
outreach efforts to warn the general public about these 
schemes and is cooperating with Salvadoran police to 
identify and convict these recruiters. 
 
--------- 
IV Fraud 
--------- 
 
 14.  Post encounters frequent family-based IV fraud. 
Applicants often submit false birth certificates to qualify 
for immigrant visas.  Some cases involve beneficiaries who 
are relatives, but not the children, of the petitioner and 
consequently are not eligible for immigrant visas.  In these 
cases, the petitioner submits a false birth certificate that 
documents the beneficiary as the petitioner's child.  In 
other cases, beneficiaries submit fraudulent birth 
certificates to hide the fact that they have aged out of 
their category.  Salvadoran documents have such low 
credibility that DNA testing to prove parentage is required 
for all beneficiaries who submit birth certificates 
registered one year or more after the child's purported date 
of birth.  When faced with the prospect of DNA testing many 
beneficiaries admit to attempted fraud. 
 
 15.  Employment-based IV fraud is rarely detected in El 
Salvador. 
 
--------- 
DV Fraud 
--------- 
 
 16.  El Salvador is not a Diversity Visa Lottery Program 
country. 
 
----------------------- 
ACS and Passport Fraud 
----------------------- 
 
 17.  The most common type of passport fraud in El Salvador 
is perpetrated by imposters using authentic U.S. birth 
certificates to fraudulently obtain U.S. passports.  In most 
of these cases, the parents of Salvadoran minors obtain 
authentic U.S. birth certificates and either claim their 
child lost a previous passport or provide false identity 
evidence to obtain a U.S. passport for the child. 
 
 18.  Another form of imposter fraud involves U.S. citizens 
lending, selling, or renting their valid passports to others 
with similar physical characteristics for illegal entry into 
the United States.  Imposters also have attempted to renew 
valid U.S. passports so that the new passport will contain 
their photograph instead of that of the original passport 
holder. 
 
--------------- 
Adoption Fraud 
--------------- 
 
 19.  Following wide-spread kidnapping and adoption fraud 
during El Salvador's civil war (1980 - 1992), the Salvadoran 
Government instituted a rigorous and time-consuming adoption 
process.  Given the bureaucracy associated with the adoption 
process in El Salvador, very few US citizens choose to adopt 
in El Salvador.  No adoption fraud has been detected. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Asylum and other DHS benefit fraud 
----------------------------------- 
 
 20.  DHS's USCIS and Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) have offices in El Salvador.  The Consular Section 
does not process Visa 92/93 cases. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Cooperation with Host Government Authorities 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
 21.  The Consular Section enjoys outstanding cooperation 
with the PNC, airport security, Immigration, and the RNPN. 
 
 22.  In May 2005 Post's Consular Section coordinated with 
the PNC Border Division to initiate a program in which the 
PNC arrests perpetrators of civil document fraud.  Under 
this program, when FPU confirms civil document fraud it 
notifies the PNC, which apprehends the perpetrator 
immediately after he or she leaves the Embassy compound. 
The PNC then questions the detainee to gather more 
information about document vendor rings. 
 
 23.  Per FAM guidance, Post regularly complies with PNC law 
enforcement requests to verify visa information related to 
ongoing criminal investigations.  These requests also enable 
Post to obtain information about criminal suspects, 
including their name, date of birth, and the nature of the 
crime for which they are being investigated.  If the crime 
involves a visa ineligibility, the FPU enters a related P 
hit for the individual in CLASS. 
 
 24.  The FPU conducts an airport visit program that includes 
regular visits by officers and LES staff.  The visits give 
consular personnel opportunities to present counter-fraud 
training for airline personnel, Salvadoran Immigration, and 
Airport Security officials and to reinforce the excellent 
relationships the Consular Section has with airport 
personnel. 
 
 25.  Post regularly requests that the RNPN confirm the 
identity and civil status of visa applicants.  Host 
government response to these requests is excellent. 
 
---------------------------- 
Areas of Particular Concern 
---------------------------- 
 
 26.  El Salvador and the United States share an increasing 
problem with crime committed by the Salvadoran-based but 
transnational gangs MS-13 and 18th Street.  To limit the 
ability of Salvadoran gang members to enter the United 
States, in June 2005 the Departments of State and Homeland 
Security approved an expanded interpretation of INA 
ineligibility 212(a)(3)(a)(ii) to exclude active members of 
Salvadoran-based gangs from receiving immigration benefits. 
Since then, Post has denied immigrant visas to several 
applicants using this ineligibility.  Post also entered the 
names of more than 6,500 suspected active gang members into 
CLASS under the expanded ineligibility.  The names were 
provided by the FBI and the Salvadoran Gang Task Force. 
Post is exploring ways to expand its cooperation with 
Salvadoran authorities and the FBI to better identify gang 
members and track their efforts to cross international 
boundaries. 
 
---------------------- 
Staffing and Training 
---------------------- 
 
 27.  Post's FPU consists of two full-time LES Fraud 
Prevention Investigators (FPI), one full-time LES Fraud 
Prevention Analyst (FPA), and a full-time consular officer 
as Fraud Prevention Manager (FPM).  Both the FPM and the FPA 
are one-year rotational positions that will have new 
incumbents in June 2006. 
 
 28.  The current FPM attended the Fraud Prevention for 
Consular Managers course (PC-541) at FSI in February 2005. 
The senior investigator attended the FSN Fraud Prevention 
Course in Washington in November 2002 and attended training 
at Post in April 2005 on how to investigate money 
laundering.  The FPU's deputy FPI and the FPA never received 
formal fraud prevention training, but the unit would greatly 
benefit from such training.  The incoming Fraud Prevention 
Manager should attend the Fraud Prevention for Consular 
Managers course before assuming the role of Fraud Prevention 
Manager. 
 
 29.  Fraud detection training materials for U.S. documents 
in Power Point would be extremely useful.  The materials 
would provide a degree of consistency for training post's 
partners around the world and would ensure that future 
updates to training materials could be made globally. 
 
Barclay
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