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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000325 
 
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STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2016 
TAGS:        
SUBJECT: YUDHOYONO VISIT TO BURMA: LIGHT AND FLUFFY 
 
REF: A. 05 RANGOON 973 
 
      B. SECSTATE 29380 
 
RANGOON 00000325  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: P/E Chief W. Patrick Murphy for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
 1. (C) Summary:  Indonesian President Yudhoyono's March 1-2 
visit to Burma appears to have been purely protocol and 
devoid of any substantive political message to regime 
leaders.  SPDC Chairman Than Shwe gave the Indonesian 
President a standard recitation of regime achievements and 
its road map to a democracy "that fits Burma," claiming that 
international pressure is slowing the process.  We are told 
that Than Shwe declined Yudhoyono's request for a one-on-one 
meeting, offering that the top generals are a team and have 
nothing to hide from one another. 
 
 2. (C) The Burmese regime pursued this visit aggressively, 
using it not only for the perceived legitimacy that a state 
visit bestows, but also to water down the unprecedented 
unified stance on Burma that ASEAN leaders adopted at their 
December Summit.  In doing so, the generals applied the same 
"divide and rule" tactics to ASEAN leaders that they use to 
break down unity among domestic opposition and ethnic groups. 
 End Summary. 
 
 3. (U) The Burmese official media gave top billing to 
Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's March 1-2 
visit to Rangoon.  Per usual practice, however, the regime 
did not reveal any details on the substance of the two-day 
state visit, instead devoting official coverage to 
Yudhoyono's visits to Rangoon's Shwedagon Pagoda and the 
regime's National Museum.  The GOB media mentioned only 
Yudhoyono's wife, Kristiani Herrawati, and Indonesian Foreign 
Minister Hassan Wirajuda as participants in the large 
Indonesian delegation.  The regime did not accord Yudhoyono 
the same pomp and circumstance that it has this week for the 
visit of Indian President Kalam. 
 
A COURTESY CALL AND NO MORE 
--------------------------- 
 
 4. (C) On March 3, Indonesian Ambassador Wyoso Prodjowarsito 
briefed members of the diplomatic corps on Yudhoyono's 
30-hour visit.  Wyoso described the visit, Yudhoyono's first 
to Burma, as "just a courtesy call" to get acquainted with 
regime leaders.  The Indonesian President did not press the 
SPDC on political reform issues, such as democracy or the 
release of Aung San Suu Kyi, although Wyoso admitted when 
questioned that UNSYG Kofi Annan and UN human rights envoy 
Pinheiro had requested Yudhoyono raise these topics. 
 
 5. (C) Wyoso said that the visit focused on increasing 
bilateral cooperation.  Accordingly, Indonesian FM Wirajuda 
and Burmese FM Nyan Win signed an MOU establishing a joint 
commission for bilateral cooperation and agreed on future 
plans to conclude separate agreements in areas such as 
culture and trade.  The first joint commission meeting will 
take place in April or May in Jakarta.  Wyoso said that 
Indonesia hopes to have some agreements ready by then, but 
admitted that nothing much has come of past agreements with 
Burma.  He added that Yudhoyono had designated former Home 
Affairs Minister Hari Sabarno as his special advisor to 
follow up on the bilateral agreements. 
 
DEMOCRACY THAT FITS BURMA 
------------------------- 
 
 6. (C) Wyoso said that Yudhoyono had two brief discussions 
with SPDC Chairman Senior General Than Shwe.  The first 
meeting was a 45-minute session that included SPDC Deputy 
Chairman Vice Senior General Maung Aye, MOD Chief of General 
Staff General Thura Shwe Man, PM Lt Gen Soe Win, Secretary-1 
 
RANGOON 00000325  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
Lt Gen Thein Sein, FM Nyan Win, and the Burmese Ambassador to 
Indonesia.  Joining Yudhoyono were Wirajuda, Sabarno, 
Economic Coordinating Minister Boediono, former FM Ali 
Alatas, and Amb. Wyoso.  Yudhoyono, who requested a private 
meeting with Than Shwe, met the SPDC Chairman in a brief 
follow-on meeting that also included the other four SPDC 
generals from the first meeting.  Amb. Wyoso did not 
participate in the "private" meeting and had nothing to offer 
on what was discussed. 
 
 7. (C) At the first session, according to Wyoso, Than Shwe 
described regime plans to move to a democracy "that fits 
Burma," claiming that international pressure had slowed 
progress.  Than Shwe also claimed to be interested in the 
"happiness" of the Burmese people, but added that democracy 
should not jeopardize the people's welfare.  The Senior 
General used to rest of the meeting to recite, as usual, 
progress the regime claims to have achieved through 
construction of roads and dams.  When diplomats asked if 
Yudhoyono would make a report about his meetings in Burma to 
ASEAN, Wyoso replied that Malaysian Foreign Minister Hamid is 
supposed to brief ASEAN Foreign Ministers on Burma in Bali 
April 19-20. 
 
 8. (C) A/CDA and P/E Chief met on March 8 with Leon de 
Riedmatten, local liaison for the UNSYG's Special Envoy to 
Burma.  De Riedmatten traveled to Jakarta in February with 
then-Special Envoy Razali to encourage the GOI to raise 
political reform issues with the regime.  They met with 
Alatas, Wirajuda, and foreign policy advisor Dino Patti 
Djalal, among others, but all rejected any expectation that 
Yudhoyono would press for reform.  They only agreed that the 
President might relate Indonesia's experience in 
transitioning from military to elected civilian rule if Than 
Shwe was willing to listen. 
 
 9. (C) According to de Riedmatten, Than Shwe was not willing 
to listen.  When Yudhoyono spontaneously requested a 
one-on-one with the SPDC Chairman at the end of the bilateral 
session, Than Shwe refused and said the generals were a team 
and had nothing to hide from one another.  Yudhoyono's 
"private" meeting with the top five generals followed and, 
according to de Riedmatten, Than Shwe unceremoniously ended 
it after less than ten minutes of pleasantries. 
 
POWERS STUCK IN THE 70s 
----------------------- 
 
 10. (C) Adik Wibowo, the World Health Organization (WHO) 
representative in Burma, attended a private lunch that 
Yudhoyono joined with the local Indonesian community.  She 
said Yudhoyono told the participants that Burma appeared to 
be stuck in the 1970s, while Indonesia moved forward and 
changed.  The Indonesian President offered his opinion that 
the Burmese military looked like it would stay in power for 
another four to seven years.  He also commented that it was 
"very strange" that the generals had relocated the capital to 
remote Pyinmana when there are so many other urgent needs in 
the country. 
 
COMMENT: DIVIDE AND RULE 
------------------------ 
 
 11. (C) Senior Indonesian officials have suggested in foreign 
press reports that Yudhoyono raised political issues with the 
SPDC, including the need for national reconciliation and a 
more inclusive "road map to democracy."  By all accounts, 
however, the visit was little more than an introductory 
"courtesy call" devoid of any substantive political message 
to regime leaders. 
 
 12. (C) Several well-connected local observers have told us 
 
RANGOON 00000325  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
that the GOB aggressively pursued the Yudhoyono visit 
immediately following the December ASEAN Summit.  The GOB 
also pushed India to move up the date of President Kalam's 
state visit from late 2006 to this month.  Not only do such 
ceremonial visits bestow a perception of legitimacy on the 
regime, they also help the SPDC stall other visitors with 
more sensitive agendas, like Malaysian FM Hamid.  In doing 
so, the generals are applying the same tactics of "divide and 
rule" and "ignore offers to mediate" to ASEAN leaders that 
they use to break unity among domestic opposition parties and 
ethnic groups.  End Comment. 
STOLTZ