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CONFIDENTIAL (97070)
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN (4678)
SECRET (11322)
SECRET//NOFORN (4330)
UNCLASSIFIED (75792)
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (58095)
Reference ID 06PRETORIA5076 (original text)
SubjectMBEKI MUM ON CALL FOR 3RD TERM AS ANC PRESIDENT
OriginEmbassy Pretoria
ClassificationCONFIDENTIAL
ReleasedAug 30, 2011 01:44
CreatedDec 20, 2006 08:03
VZCZCXYZ0005
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSA #5076/01 3540803
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 200803Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7372
INFO RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN 3737
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC C O N F I D E N T I A L PRETORIA 005076 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2016 
TAGS:      
SUBJECT: MBEKI MUM ON CALL FOR 3RD TERM AS ANC PRESIDENT 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric M. Bost.  Reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
 1. (C) SUMMARY.  With only eleven months to go until the ANC 
national conference, the succession battle is beginning to be 
played out publicly.  Earlier this month, Mbeki was both 
heckled by pro-Zuma supporters in KwaZulu-Natal and 
"encouraged" to run for a third term as party president by 
Eastern Cape ANC provincial structures.  Though Mbeki has 
said publicly he will not run for a third term as President 
of South Africa, he has yet to comment on the ANC Presidency. 
 It remains to be seen whether Mbeki's silence reflects 
serious consideration of a third term or political 
maneuvering to ensure he has enough support to pick and 
choose his successor. END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------------- 
MBEKI'S GETS EASTERN CAPE ENDORSEMENT 
------------------------------------- 
 
 2. (C) On December 3, the Eastern Cape branch of the ANC, 
which traditionally holds the largest voting bloc, adopted a 
resolution at its provincial conference "encouraging" Mbeki 
to stand for a third term as President of the ANC.  (Note: 
Eastern Cape is considered the heartland of the ANC and is 
also Mbeki's home province.)  The Center for Policy Studies' 
senior political analyst Aubrey Matshiqi told PolOff on 
December 6 that the resolution was never discussed in plenary 
and caught many delegates off-guard.  The resolution was 
passed shortly after former Eastern Cape education MEC Stone 
Sizani, a staunch Mbeki ally, was named ANC Chairperson for 
the province with 56 percent of the vote. 
 
----------------------------- 
MBEKI HECKLED; ANC OVERREACTS 
----------------------------- 
 
 3. (C) This moral boost for Mbeki was in sharp contrast to 
the caustic reception he received the day before at the 
December 2 reburial memorial ceremony for ANC hero Moses 
Mabhiba in KwaZulu-Natal.  Hundreds of pro-Zuma supporters 
disrupted Mbeki's eulogy by trying to walk out of the 
stadium.  Upon realizing that the gates were being locked, 
the crowd began singing Zuma's trademark song, "Bring Me My 
Machine Gun."  Though Zuma tried to quiet the crowd by asking 
everyone to show the President respect, this fell on deaf 
ears.  (Note:  In September, Zuma supporters walked out on 
Mbeki at Durban's Kingsmead Stadium during the Indian Prime 
Minister's visit.) 
 
 4. (C) In addition to locking the gates once the ANC realized 
people were trying to leave, ANC Secretary General Kgalema 
Mothlante announced the next day that those who tried to walk 
out on Mbeki would be "barred forever from any activity of 
the ANC...like skinheads who disrupt soccer matches in 
Europe."  During a December 6 roundtable on current political 
events, Professor Sipho Seepe, Academic Director of the 
Henley Management College, spoke about how the ANC's strong 
response demonizes the right to dissent.  He also stressed 
that the ANC needs to learn how to listen to, tolerate, and 
manage differences of opinion.  This theme of intolerance has 
been repeated to PolOff by both Claire Benit, Senior 
Researcher of the Human Sciences Research Council who has 
studied local government structures since 1994, and Raenette 
Taljaard, former MP of the Democratic Alliance and current 
Director of the Helen Suzman Foundation, who both feel that 
the ANC is becoming increasingly intolerant of dissent. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
LONG-TERM IMPLICATIONS NOT CLEAR-CUT FOR EITHER CAMP 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
 5. (C) Numerous press reports have interpreted both events as 
a victory for pro-Mbeki supporters, who believe ANC 
provincial structures are now one step closer to controlling 
the outcome of succession next year.  The Eastern Cape is 
traditionally the largest party voting bloc and therefore has 
a disproportionate influence.  (Note: Eastern Cape had 655 
voting delegates at the 2002 national conference; the next 
largest voting bloc was KZN with 393 votes.)  Matshiqi also 
argues that the heckling incident seriously damaged Zuma's 
credibility because it reinforced the idea that "only 
uneducated hooligans" support him. 
 
 6. (C) While these events may have strengthened Mbeki's 
position, by no means do they guarantee his success in 
winning a third term, should he seek it.  The Eastern Cape 
provincial endorsement is the first quasi-official 
endorsement for Mbeki.  Zuma already has received unequivocal 
endorsements from the national ANC Youth League, Youth 
Communist League, and the KZN ANC provincial executive 
committee.  Sizani's slim victory also has been taken by some 
to signal growing support for Zuma in the province.  If true, 
the Eastern Cape is likely to go to the national conference 
fractured, as was the case in 2002 when delegates spoke out 
against each other while voting for NEC members.  When 
Mothlante was asked whether or not ANC unity in the Eastern 
Cape was possible, he refused to answer by saying, "I don't 
want to speculate whether any block will survive beyond this 
conference." (COMMENT: Mothlante is widely viewed to be 
backed by the pro-Zuma camp as a compromise candidate. END 
COMMENT) 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
MBEKI'S SILENCE LEADS TO WIDESPREAD SPECULATION 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
 7. (C) Although Mbeki has said clearly and publicly that he 
will not seek another term as President of South Africa, he 
has not spoken out about the possibility of retaining the 
party presidency.  His silence is fueling speculation that he 
is amenable to the idea.  Taljaard told PolOffs December 13 
that she believes it is a "possibility" and would be a way 
for Mbeki to avoid being a lame duck and to control his 
legacy.  She speculated that Mbeki's eventual decision would 
depend on what else Mbeki was offered, noting the limited 
options available to former presidents on the continent. 
(COMMENT: If Taljaard is right, the crux of the problem is 
timing since any offers that come Mbeki's way are likely to 
arrive after next year's ANC national conference and closer 
to the end of his Presidential term. END COMMENT) 
 
 8. (C) Mbeki's silence also has unleashed numerous negative 
editorials, which point out that there is no shortage of 
political talent in the country.  During the December 6 
roundtable debate, Professor Xolela Mangcu, visiting fellow 
at both Witwatersrand and Harvard Universities, told the 
audience that those calling for a third term were "playing 
with fire" and that the perception of a powergrab could 
create "an ethnic backlash right in the bosom of the ANC." 
Though many believe that a third term for Mbeki would instill 
a sense of security, Mangcu argued the opposite would happen. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
 9. (C) With only eleven months to go until the ANC national 
conference, the succession battle is beginning to be played 
out publicly.  Securing support from provincial structures is 
the first big step in the process, and the race is on.  It is 
unclear whether Mbeki's silence reflects serious 
consideration of a third term or political maneuvering to 
secure sufficient support to be able to handpick his 
successor. 
BOST
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