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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHJM #0720/01 0481109
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O 171109Z FEB 06
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0441
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L JERUSALEM 000720 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE, NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MUSTAFA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2016 
TAGS:              
SUBJECT: INCOMING FATAH PLC MEMBERS TAKE 'WAIT AND SEE' 
APPROACH WITH HAMAS 
 
 
Classified By: Consul General Jake Walles, per reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
 1.    (C) Summary.  In separate February 15 meetings with 
ConGen Poloff, newly elected Fatah Palestinian Legislative 
Council (PLC) members Dr. Emile Jarjou'i and Dr. Bernard 
Sabella, urged caution from both Fatah and the international 
community in its approach toward the incoming Hamas-led 
government.  Jarjou'i indicated that Fatah would not join 
Hamas in a National Unity Government and would instead form 
the opposition in the PLC.  On Hamas governance, Jarjou'i 
expected Hamas to perform in the same organized and 
disciplined manner that it displayed in the run-up to the 
elections.  Sabella expressed concern that Fatah's absence 
from the government could place the movement in an even 
weaker position in the event that Hamas performs well in 
running the Palestinian Authority (PA).  Jarjou'i and Sabella 
agreed that significant changes needed to occur within Fatah 
in order for the movement to present an effective challenge 
to Hamas, but suggested that the Sixth Fatah Congress would 
take place no earlier than the end of the year.  End summary. 
 
Jarjou'i: Fatah to 
Remain in Opposition 
-------------------- 
 
 2.    (C) Dr. Emile Jarjou'i (a member of the PLO Executive 
Committee), retained his PLC seat in the January 25 elections 
by winning one of the two allotted Christian seats for 
Jerusalem (Sabella won the other Christian seat).  Jarjou'i 
told Poloff that the scheduled February 18 inauguration of 
the new PLC would provide the first indication as to how 
Hamas will approach its role in the legislative body and in 
the formation of the Palestinian cabinet.  Based on 
conversations that incoming Fatah PLC members had with Abu 
Mazen on February 11 in Ramallah, Jarjou'i expected that 
Fatah would not join Hamas in a National Unity Government nor 
assume any leadership positions within the PLC.  He described 
PLC member Azzam al-Ahmad -- who was chosen over Muhammad 
Dahlan by Fatah PLC members in a February 11 vote -- as well 
qualified to head the Fatah opposition in the Council. 
 
 3.    (C) Jarjou'i said that he had no prior relationship 
with the four incoming Hamas PLC members from Jerusalem who 
won seats in the district elections.  He was more familiar 
with Jerusalemite Muhammad Abu Tir, the number two person on 
the Hamas national list behind Ismai'l Hanniyah.  Despite 
having limited knowledge regarding the incoming Hamas members 
to the PLC, Jarjou'i expected that the movement would show a 
similar degree of organization and discipline witnessed 
during the run-up to the legislative elections. 
 
Sabella Taking New 
PLC Role in Stride 
------------------ 
 
 4.    (C) Bethlehem University Sociology Professor Dr. 
Bernard Sabella, who won the other Christian seat in 
Jerusalem, told ConGen Poloff that he was just coming to 
terms with his new role as a member of the PLC.  While eager 
to engage directly with, and work for the benefit of, his 
Jerusalem constituency, Sabella said that he was still unsure 
about the role he would play in the legislative body.  (Note: 
The Jerusalem district includes residents of East Jerusalem 
and the surrounding Palestinian villages to the north and 
east of the city.  Both Jarjou'i and Sabella received less 
than 6,000 votes each in the elections, which lagged well 
behind the top vote recipients of Hamas, but proved 
sufficient to attain seats under the Christian quota.  End 
note.)  Sabella said that he had been informed that, in his 
capacity as a member of the PLC, he would be provided a 
secretary, bodyguard, and driver.  He joked that he had less 
 
SIPDIS 
need for a bodyguard than someone with an academic degree who 
could help sort out the contours of his constituency. 
Sabella said that he intended to spend the next few months 
talking to Palestinians to learn their needs before coming 
out with a specific agenda. 
 
Sabella Advocates 
Cautious Approach 
----------------- 
 
 5.    (C) Sabella worried that threats to cut off 
international financial assistance to Palestinians under a 
Hamas-led government would punish ordinary Palestinians 
already burdened by high unemployment and limited economic 
prospects.  He thought it was unreasonable to expect Hamas to 
change its political positions within two to three months. 
Instead, practical solutions were required to help the 
quality of life for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza 
 
while allowing Hamas time to live up to prior international 
commitments. 
 
 6.    (C) Sabella suggested that a purported USG/Israeli plan 
toward Hamas, as reported in the February 14 "New York Times" 
article, would backfire because it would inflame Palestinian 
sentiments to the detriment of Fatah.  Alternatively, Sabella 
argued that there were legitimate reasons for Fatah to join 
the next government, which, at a minimum, would allow Fatah 
to avoid further marginalization.  While he acknowledged that 
the majority of Fatah opposed joining the government, he 
thought that such a tactic left Fatah with few good 
alternatives.  Like Jarjou'i, Sabella was unfamiliar with the 
Hamas PLC colleagues from Jerusalem, but nonetheless expected 
a close working relationship with them in the council. 
 
Long Road For 
Fatah Rehabilitation 
-------------------- 
 
 7.    (C) Both Jarjou'i and Sabella expressed confidence in 
Abu Mazen's leadership, noting that Abu Mazen had taken a 
firm line with respect to calling on Hamas to uphold prior 
international commitments.  Internally, Abu Mazen faced a 
tougher challenge with Fatah.  Neither expected the Sixth 
Fatah Congress to occur in March, as originally scheduled. 
Rather, both expected the Sixth Congress to convene no 
earlier than the end of the year.  Sabella said that the 
results of the elections should signal a "wake-up call" for 
Fatah, adding that Fatah needed to show better discipline 
whereby the political agenda would rise above the special 
interests of the individual members.  Fatah's ability to 
match Hamas on the national list (29 seats for Hamas versus 
28 seats for Fatah) suggested to Sabella that Fatah still 
maintained support among the grassroots.  Jarjou'i also 
anticipated a long struggle ahead for Fatah to regain its 
leading role in the Palestinian national movement. 
 
WALLES