VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHJM #1622/01 1111630
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 211630Z APR 06
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1694
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L JERUSALEM 001622 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE AND IPA; NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/LOGERFO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2016 
TAGS:        
SUBJECT: IMPLICATIONS OF JAMAL ABU SAMHADANEH SELECTION AS 
MOI IG 
 
REF: JERUSALEM 1448 
 
Classified By: Consul General Jake Walles: Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
 1. (C) The April 20 announcement of PRC head Jamal Abu 
Samhadaneh as Inspector General for the MOI is widely seen as 
a reaction to Abu Mazen's recent appointment of Rashid Abu 
Shubak as internal security chief and has set up a 
confrontation between the Hamas cabinet and Abu Mazen.  The 
President met April 21 with the PLO Executive Committee and 
subsequently issued a decree effectively canceling both the 
appointment of Abu Samhadaneh and the MOI's announcement of a 
new volunteer security force.  Hamas has yet to react to the 
move by Abu Mazen and the PLO, but the situation demonstrates 
ongoing tensions regarding the security forces and command 
relationships. 
 
-------------- 
Hamas Decision 
-------------- 
 
 2. (C) The April 20 appointment of Popular Resistance 
Committee (PRC) head Jamal Abu Samhadaneh as Inspector 
General for the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) by Hamas 
Interior Minister Said Siyyam is a reflection of the 
worsening security situation in Gaza and the struggle between 
President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) and Hamas regarding 
security force organization.   Abu Samhadaneh's appointment 
is seen by many as a Hamas reaction to Abu Mazen's recent 
promotion of Fatah stalwart Rashid Abu Shubak as internal 
security chief within the MOI (reftel).  There is no clearly 
understood job description for either inspector general or 
internal security chief, which may itself lead to tensions if 
both men attempt to assert overall command of those security 
forces under the MOI (PSO, Civil Police, Civil Defense).  Abu 
Samhadaneh is also a bitter rival of ex-Preventive Security 
Organization Chief Mohammad Dahlan, and the appointment is 
likely to worsen a already tense security situation in Gaza, 
which has been marked by armed conflicts between PSO officers 
and various militant groups 
 
 3. (C) Abu Samhadaneh has a bloody history in Gaza dating 
back to the first intifada. He was responsible for many 
attacks on Israelis and murders of alleged Palestinian 
collaborators.  In the second intifada he left the security 
forces to lead a segment of the PRC in southern Gaza.  The 
PRC is believed to be responsible for the October 2003 
killings of three U.S. DynCorp contractors in Gaza.  In 
recent years, the Abu Samhadaneh segment of the PRC has 
worked closely with Hamas.  Abu Samhadaneh's influence in 
Gaza is such that Fatah reached out to him in the fall of 
2005, offering him the position of military intelligence 
chief in Gaza, which became vacant upon the killing of Musa 
Arafat in September 2005.  The offer - which he declined - 
was seen as an attempt to co-opt Abu Samhadaneh and the 
militias which report to him, estimated to number several 
thousand. 
 
 4. (C) In addition to making Abu Samhadaneh Inspector 
General, Interior Minister Siyyam simultaneously announced 
that the MOI would form a force composed of volunteers from 
existing security forces and members of various armed 
factions; Siyyam claimed that the force would work to support 
PA security forces but not to replace them.  Presidential 
Spokesman Nabil Abu Rudeinah took issue with the Hamas 
announcement, saying the decision was illegal and not 
provided for in PA laws or regulations. 
 
---------------------- 
Abu Mazen/PLO Reaction 
---------------------- 
 
 5. (C) On April 21, after a PLO Executive Committee meeting, 
Abu Mazen issued a decree canceling the decisions of Minister 
Siyyam, which would vitiate Abu Samhadaneh's appointment and 
the creation of a new force. While the decision was made in a 
PLO meeting, Abu Mazen issued the decree in his capacity as 
chairman of the PLO and President of the PA.  The decree will 
be sent to the Prime Minister and the Interior Minister, and 
the PLO Executive Committee will release a statement that 
actions such as those recently taken by Siyyam are 
unconstitutional. 
 
 6. (C) There is no reaction from Hamas as yet. The decisions 
by Siyyam and Abu Mazen may simply presage further 
 
constitutional conflicts between Abu Mazen and the Hamas 
government. 
 
WALLES